Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 102

the Army’s
formal
professional
military education (PME)
system,
primarily
through the
establishment
of the Army
University,
which is
expected
to increase
rigor and
effectiveness
in all Army
courses.4
Regardless of
these efforts,
PME’s scope
and duration are insufficient to effectively transfer all
knowledge necessary for professional soldiers and leaders.
Operating in our complex modern world requires our
leaders and formations to be agile and adaptive, but we
currently do not have a system in place to give them all
the skill sets and capabilities necessary to win. The overarching problem is that training is not treated as learning, especially in the operating force. Unit commanders
often expect soldiers and leaders to arrive at their units
following PME with all the necessary knowledge to
perform as a part of the team.5 Without significant
expansion of PME, however, this expectation is unrealistic. Compounding this problem, Army operational
training doctrine such as Army Doctrine Publication 7-0,
Training Units and Developing Leaders, does not provide
sufficient guidance or direction to plan effective learning experiences. Many in the operating force view the
training they conduct more as rehearsals of skills rather
than deliberate experiences to learn new skills or knowledge.6 Where PME is embracing evidence-based learning
practices from academia, doctrine for training does not
take advantage of the advances in the learning sciences.
To prepare its leaders and formations to win in a complex
world, the Army must get more educational value from
training conducted in the operating force. The Army
can accomplish this by applying the science of learning
100

25th Infantry Division soldiers view video feed from a Phantom 4 Quadcopter unmanned aerial system during the Pacific
Manned-Unmanned Initiative 22 July 2016 at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Hawaii. The exercise provided an opportunity
for soldiers, partnered with organizations and agencies such as the
Maneuver Center of Excellence and the U.S. Army Tank Automotive
Research Development and Engineering Center to test and learn
from new technology in the field. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher
Hubenthal, U.S. Air Force)

and instructional design to create training events that
not only are realistic but also transfer necessary knowledge and provide sufficient motivation. The Army must
develop doctrine and guidance based on a constructivist
philosophy of cognitive learning theory and provide
commanders with tools to design training as deliberate
learning experiences.

Defining the Problem
To manage the development of its leaders, the Army
uses a structure of domains in which training and education occur: institutional, operational, and self-development.7 According to doctrine, training and education
occur in each of these three domains, but to varying
degrees. The operational domain is characterized by an
emphasis on training, particularly as a member of an operational unit but also through broadening experiences.
November-December 2016  MILITARY REVIEW