Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 89

AIR FORCE TAKE NOTE

MC and previous doctrinal approaches is increased
empowerment of subordinate leaders. Higher echelon
leaders issue orders to lower echelons with the who,
what, when, where, and why. However, under MC, they
are careful not to tell subordinate leaders the how.
Why are these doctrinal changes important to
the Air Force? Quesada and Bradley provide another
applicable case study. One example of their cooperation
in doctrinal initiatives was the birth of the modern-day
air liaison officer. During discussion between the two
generals, Quesada requested permission to install
common radio sets in some of Bradley’s tanks. Bradley
agreed. Quesada then placed a pilot in each of the radio-equipped tanks and scheduled aircraft to operate in
waves over their locations.28 The results were amazing.
Due to this innovation, air support requests that had
often gone unfilled or took hours for a response at the
beginning of World War II were processed quickly, and
the ability to attack targets in close proximity to friendly
forces improved dramatically. Air support to ground
operations was greatly improved.
This advance reached a pinnacle of success during
the Third Army’s push to Bastogne, Belgium, during
the Battle of the Bulge (16 December 1944–25 January
1945) to relieve the weary 101st Airborne Division,
which was surrounded by German forces. Army tankers met significant German resistance near the town of
Remichampgane. As a consequence, U.S. forces radioed
for air support, and P-47 “Thunderbolts” arrived overhead only twenty minutes later. The aircraft dropped
ordnance that destroyed German positions within
hundreds of yards of the friendly front line, enabling the
American tanks to forge ahead.29 This incident, together
with many others like it, prompted one general defending in Bastogne to remark, “The fighter-bombers did
work equivalent to the employment of two U.S. Infantry
Divisions.”30 This was high praise, given the complete lack
of U.S. CAS capability at the outset of World War II.
How does this history apply to the current situation
and recent Army doctrinal changes? First, it is easy to
trace Bradley and Quesada’s plan to the current JP 3-09.3,
Close Air Support, requirement for detailed CAS integration.31 Second, though the Air Force can employ
elements of MC, it cannot completely adopt the concept
due to inherent constraints on some of its components.
And, third, the Army employment of ULO may require
the Air Force to make some significant changes.
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2015

The Air Force already uses MC in numerous environments. When a strike package mission commander is
tasked to destroy a target, he or she is told the what and
when, but definitely not the how. On the other hand, Air
Force nuclear missile operators must work under tight
centralized control. Numerous other similar examples
of Air Force organizations exist for which MC is not feasible, so the bottom line is this: the Air Force can adopt
some elements of MC but not the entire doctrine.
For example, the Air Force does not have sufficient
airframes to align a four-ship formation of F-16s with
a specific Army battalion, so the Air Force needs centralized control of those aircraft in order to maximize
their effectiveness. Consequently, the Army’s approach
to ULO will influence the Air Force. As the F-35 and
F-22 become the backbone of the fighter force, innovative techniques and smart procurement can ensure
tactical air support retains its current outstanding
capability. The Air Force continues to ramp up the
number of MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial systems
in the fleet. In a permissive environment, the MQ-9 is
an excellent CAS platform. The increased number of
aircraft, long-on-station time, and significant ordnance
load of the MQ-9 are a powerful combination for future hybrid-threat operations. The MQ-9 is a multidimensional weapon system with a wide variety of uses.
As Air Force field grade officers influence procurement
decisions, the MQ-9 is an excellent model to follow.
The Air Force needs to replace its aging T-38 jet trainer fleet. The new trainer should follow the MQ-9 model
as a multidimensional platform capable of a variety of
missions. Trainer-X is an excellent example of an opportunity for Air Force officers to critically consider ways to
solve multiple needs with a single solution. A new trainer
is required; however, what else does the joint force need?
Pilots selected to fly the F-22 and F-35 require advanced
pretraining because of their new aircrafts’ capabilities
and the lack of two-seat trainer variants. Additionally,
flying the F-22 and F-35 for some missions does not make
sense. Using F-22s as alert aircraft or for continental
U.S. combat air patrols is costly and taxes a very limited
resource. Finally, the F-22 and F-35 are often flown in an
adversary role to simulate threat aircraft. This use of costly
air craft as “Red Air” wastes resources. Can the new trainer
accomplish all three of these missions? Can the Air Force
purchase an aircraft capable of training that also possesses
a combat capability? This combat-coded trainer may not
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