Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 85

AIR FORCE TAKE NOTE

Historical Precedence—
Generals Bradley and Quesada
The air and land components have compromised
before. During World War II, Gen. Bradley commanded First Army. His Army Air Corps counterpart and
the commander of IX Tactical Air Command was Gen.
Quesada.1 Thomas Hughes, author of Overlord: General
Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in
World War II, summarizes their relationship: “The two
had a common zeal to win the war and to ignore the
bitter history of air-ground animosity.”2
Bradley and Quesada helped enable the effective
innovation of CAS during World War II. At the outset
of the war, the United States did not have the capability
to conduct efficient CAS. During the interwar period,
political maneuvering and a focus on strategic bombers
took the Army Air Corps in a direction away from CAS.
Dr. Richard Muller, professor of airpower history at the
U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies,
states, “The strides made in aircraft technology during the
1930s virtually expunged close air support from the Air
Corps’ roster of capabilities.”3 Gen. Henry “Hap” Arnold
believed CAS should not be the Air Corps’ focus. He felt
even the name—close air support—indicated the Air
Corps was subsidiary to ground forces. Arnold placed
CAS sixth on his prioritized list of air tasks.4
Quesada and Bradley overcame these hurdles. By
the end of World War II, CAS operations became a key
element in the defeat of Axis forces. An example from
D-Day helps demonstrate this claim and shows the fruit
of the cooperation between Bradley and Quesada. Close
air support, or tactical aviation, was a key enabler of the
breakout from the beaches of Normandy. Specifically,
CAS helped link the two American footholds at the Utah
and Omaha Beaches.5 The town of Carentan, located
thirty miles inland, quickly became a key piece of terrain.
Controlling Carentan would bridge the two American
beachheads and avoid a potentially nightmarish fight
in regions flooded by the German defenders.6 Securing
Carentan became the task of the 101st Airborne Division.
Unfortunately, the lightly equipped 101st faced Germans
equipped with much heavier weaponry.7 Tactical airpower
provided the 101st the firepower it needed. Planes from
Quesada’s command spotted a two-division-sized group of
Germans known as Kampfgruppe Heinz. P-51 and P-47
aircraft brought these German reinforcements to a near
standstill.8 Even Field Marshall Erwin Rommel recognized
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2015

the impact of U.S. tactical air support. In a letter to his wife,
he lamented, “The enemy’s air superiority has a very grave
effect on our movements. There’s simply no answer to it.”9
Kampfgruppe Heinz eventually limped into Carentan, but
most of the force was more than a week late.
The Germans had to evacuate Carentan because
of CAS’s decisive role. The German army commander,
Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, believed they lost
Carentan due to the “unbearable” air attacks making
daytime movement “impossible.”10 Quesada’s fighters answered 184 CAS requests during the first week following
the invasion.
Tactical aviation grew rapidly from 1941–1945. The
relationship between Bradley and Quesada facilitated
that growth. Throughout this discussion, other examples
from their excellent working relationship will shed light
on how Air Force leaders can focus decision making to
support the rapidly changing Army.

Army Size and Restructuring
Requires Air Force Critical Thinking
Sometimes innovation is a luxury; sometimes it is
a requirement. The Army is drastically reducing its
size, which is driving significant changes in organization. Although some of these changes are required, the
Army is using the opportunity to innovate. Air Force
leaders must understand these changes and think critically a bout how to support future Army operations.
On 30 July 2013, U.S. Army Forces Command issued
a warning order (WARNO) regarding brigade combat
team (BCT) reorganization. The WARNO reiterated
an Army end strength of 490,000 soldiers by the end of
fiscal year 2017.11 The order goes on to provide specifics
on a new force structure and the number of BCTs—the
Army’s primary fighting element. When considering
these new numbers, it is important to consider remarks
by former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. On 31
July 2013, Hagel indicated that sequestration budget
cuts could drive the planned end strength to 380,000
soldiers.12 These changes are significant. What are
they? And, how do they impact the Air Force?
Over the past two years, the Army significantly reduced its active strength from approximately
570,000 soldiers to just under 495,000—a loss of
75,000 personnel. As this is happening, the Army
is shifting to its 2020 BCT design.13 The Army has
three categories of ground maneuver BCTs: infantry,
79