Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 71

UAS THREAT

technological advances—was a leader in revolutionizing the offensive use of UASs to support land power
during its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, it now
must show at least as much leadership by allocating
resources to defend itself against the growing threat
of UASs, or, at some point, the Nation will be unpleasantly and tragically surprised. This article will provide
six recommendations for assuming such a leadership
role by adopting a joint approach for implementing
counter-UAS (C-UAS) operations.

Background and Context
Much of the contemporary attention on UASs in
the media and from the public is focused on the commercialization of unmanned capabilities, the legality
and impact on the laws of warfare stemming from the
use of UASs against terrorists, and calls to stem the
proliferation of this growing technological capability in
general. Although these are all important discussions,
missing from the discourse on UASs is the critical
discussion of how to defend against a UAS attack or
against a persistent enemy intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance threat from this technology.
While the United States has successfully employed
UASs to support its strategic objectives basically unchallenged in both Iraq and Afghanistan for more than
ten years, many nations and nonstate actors have been
acquiring the ability to field their own UASs as a result
of the proliferation of new technology in the field. This
means many already have the ability to employ them
against the United States and its allies. Consequently,
the limited U.S. capability to neutralize UASs guided
by sophisticated surveillance technology and equipped
with weapons that are accurate at a distance—especially at the tactical and operational levels of warfare—is already a serious vulnerability that should be
addressed in policy similar to that concerning UAS use
in the offensive.1
Improved technology associated with the application of UASs on the battlefield has already caused
changes that will have a long-term impact on the
future application of military power. For example,
reputedly covert targeted strikes against terrorist
targets are now relatively common practice. Such
will continue to be the norm on future battlefields.
However, the transition of UASs from covert action to
more conventional applications by the United States
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2015

and its adversaries poses an important question: Are
U.S. forces trained, equipped, and organized to successfully defend the Nation against UAS infiltrations
and attacks? Currently the answer is no. Consequently,
as a matter of prudent policy, it is imperative that the
United States develop a credible capability to counter
the use of UASs against its forces and its allies.2
Technological improvements support the growth
and proliferation of a commercial market that desires to exploit the capabilities of UASs.3 According
to the Teal Group’s 2014 market study, “the overall
UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] electronics market
is the world’s fastest-growing aerospace payload
market, with spending on UAVs to nearly double
over the next decade from current worldwide UAV
expenditures of $6.4 billion annually to $11.5 billion,
totaling almost $91 billion in the next ten years.”4
Such investment will add to the existing four thousand different unmanned aircraft platforms in circulation in the global market and to the number of
countries (already at seventy-six) known or suspected to have military UASs.5
Moreover, sources of demand for UASs are shifting. It is projected that at least one-quarter of that
demand will come from outside the United States by
2023.6 This rapid global proliferation of UAS capabilities will have a direct impact on U.S. operational
accessibility (the ability to project military force into
an operational area with sufficient freedom of action
to accomplish the mission) in future operations.7

Preparing for a Growing Threat
Current service and joint C-UAS capabilities cannot protect U.S. forces. As a result, the United States
may have already lost much of its freedom of action
to operate and maintain operational dominance over
an adversary possessing an unexpectedly sophisticated
UAS capability. This lack of C-UAS capabilities also
means a greater likelihood for increased casualties and
a lower probability for mission success. In other words,
if proper steps are not taken to develop robust C-UAS
capabilities, the president and Congress may find
themselves in the not-too-distant future with significantly less flexibility in their options during a crisis,
and thus they may feel unduly hesitant to use ground
forces at critical times due to the higher level of risk.
More limited options for using force will directly
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