Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 42

to new fronts, and ultimately, in orderly withdrawal.
Despite the extreme physical exertion, Kluck’s troops
never failed to meet his expectations.
However, since this was the first German campaign
using such large armies, by the end of the advance,
8-9 September, the mutual understanding required for
properly executing mission-command-style control
broke down between Moltke’s headquarters and the
commanders in the field. Differing understandings of
the operational situation and the capabilities of the
troops showed a rift, which resulted in the ordering of
a controversial German retreat that many would later
bitterly complain was unnecessary.2

Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent

(Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

Imperial German Army Col. Gen. Alexander von Kluck, 30 March 1915

A combination of excellent organization, training,
and staff work was essential in the creation of cohesive
units. Those units performed well at the tactical and
operational levels in the Marne campaign, as typified
by the maneuvers Kluck had his corps and divisions
conduct when he changed the facing of his army from
south to east and shifted it twenty miles to the northwest while in contact with the enemy. However, the
most important factor in this equation was leadership.
The mutual trust of leaders at all echelons ensured
that Kluck was not asking the impossible—but merely
the almost impossible.

Create Shared Understanding
At the operational level, commanders shared an
understanding of the expected operational environment and the capabilities of their troops. Col. Gen.
Alexander von Kluck, the commander of the First
Army, in particular, showed a great understanding of
the capabilities of his soldiers, marching them relentlessly during the campaign in the advance, in shifting
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Closely related to this rift in perception of the situation, German commanders failed in the modern mission-command model primarily by failing to effectively
provide a clear commander’s intent. This failure was
due to a combination of the German Army’s command
climate, the lack of adequate communications technology for an advancing mass army, and the relatively
weak and vacillating personality of the senior German
commander, Chief of the General Staff Moltke.
Command climate. Moltke was the de facto field
commander of the German forces—with the Kaiser
as the nominal commander. Moltke’s uncle, Field
Marshal Helmut von Moltke (the Elder), had led
Prussia to victory in the Wars of German Unification
(1864-71) and had practically invented the concept of
mission command, which he pioneered along with the
unique German dual-command system. Under this
system, a specially trained General Staff officer (chief
of staff ) was paired with each senior commander
above the brigade level. This officer shared responsibility for command decisions with the commander.
Commanders rarely went against the opinion of their
General Staff partner. This created a command climate that allowed for the extensive use of mission orders because General Staff officers could be expected
to know what needed to be done in familiar situations
based on training, experience, and constant participation in contingency planning, which reduced the need
for detailed instructions.
The effect of strategy on operations. In the prewar period, the German General Staff headquarters
in Berlin had, mainly, devoted itself to the study of
November-December 2015  MILITARY REVIEW