Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 40
units attached to the cavalry—slowed the Allied advance
enough that the Germans were able to respond.
Having become aware of the gap that had
opened in his lines, on 8 September Moltke sent his
intelligence officer, General Staff Lt. Col. Richard
Hentsch, as an emissary to assess and advise his
subordinate army commanders. Cautious and
conservative by nature, and with an imperfect
picture of the overall situation, Hentsch reacted
by persuading the equally cautious Bülow to begin
a retreat the next day, an action which would then
force Kluck to do so as well.
With conflicting and late orders among German
forces as well as battlefield setbacks for both sides,
9 September dawned; it was destined to be an odd
day. The British had reached and were crossing the
Marne alongside the French Sixth Army, fighting
German cavalry rear guards as well as the right flank
of Bülow’s Second Army. The Germans were also
trying to keep the initiative by attacking. Kluck was
attempting to outflank the French Sixth Army, while
Bülow, although pulling back his right flank, was
still attacking and almost destroying the new French
Ninth Army on his left flank. This chaotic dichotomy ended during the afternoon of 9 September when
the Germans began a general retreat.
Subsequently, over the next three days the
Germans withdrew thirty miles to the northeast to
the line of the Aisne River, where ridges north of the
river provided ideal defensive terrain. The Germans
Ge
rm
an
German First Army
Aisne
Sec
ond
Arm
y
iss
Briti
Exped sh
itiona
ry
Force
French Fifth Army
Ou
rcq
So
French Sixth Army
on
s
Reims
rne
Ma
rne
Ma
To Paris
Gran
Peti
t
1
3
5
Miles
10
d Mo
rin
Mor
St. Gond Marshes
in
Fre
nc
hN
int
hA
rm
y
Figure 4. Final Disposition of Forces
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November-December 2015 MILITARY REVIEW