Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 144
to a situation that was the closest the United States and
the Soviet Union would ever come to nuclear war during
the twentieth century.
The primary focus of the book is the invasion plan
itself, OPLAN 316-62, and the many assumptions the
Continental Army Command and XVIII Airborne
Corps planners made. As it turns out, the United States
had a very poor appreciation of the terrain and the disposition of Cuban and Soviet forces on the island, as well
as the attitude of the Cuban population in their support
for Fidel Castro. Compounding these problems was
the magnitude of logistical resources that were needed
to move U.S. forces from their various home bases to
staging areas in Florida, and then into assault echelons
for a multi-axis assault onto the island. As the planners
started to war-game the deployment, the assault, and the
post-attack stabilization phase, they quickly realized they
lacked sufficient transportation assets to move tanks
and other heavy equipment into position to keep pace
with the intended assault timetable. As the war-gaming
continued, they soon realized that if the Soviets fired
even one tactical nuclear weapon against the U.S. forces
attempting to invade the island, the invasion plan likely
would be called off, and the conflict would become a
quid-pro-quo battle of tactical nuclear weapons.
Other significant findings from the war-gaming
included a high number of expected casualties on both
sides. At that time, the combined Soviet and Cuban forces outnumbered the projected U.S. forces approximately
three to one. And, if the U.S. forces were successful in
defeating their adversaries on the island, the U.S. forces
would likely remain there for months trying to restore
order and services for the population—which the forces
were not prepared to do.
Finally, the author