Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 140

of Vietnam (ARVN), echoing Andrew Weist’s argument
that sufficient spirit of resistance remained within it, only
needing more encouragement. His chapter entitled “The
Americans Abandon the South Vietnamese” will startle—and possibly shock—some readers with its very brief
description of the terms of the Paris Peace Accords of 1973
and the subsequent drastic reduction in foreign aid that all
but guaranteed the Republic of Vietnam’s demise at the
hands of its communist enemies.
The chapters on the 1968 Tet Offensive and the 1972
Easter Offensive contain analysis more familiar to military
readers, as these recount the unmitigated tactical disasters the ARVN and their American and free world allies
inflicted. Less well known are the notions that the South
Vietnamese public rallied against the Communists in the
wake of Tet and that the ARVN enjoyed a much-needed
morale boost after it turned back the Easter Offensive,
admittedly with help from American airpower.
In addition, the intense vitriol that the author employs
against the American press for intentionally misrepresenting the situation at specified times and places is not surprising. While readers probably have been exposed to this
before, they will appreciate some of the specifics he relates
in precise detail.
Next, we come to the bad: The reader cannot escape
Professor Joes’ continuously asking, “What if?” While a
wonderful exercise in imagination and fuel for counterfactual reasoning scenarios in historical war-gaming, this
is not strictly history. One might have titled the book Why
South Vietnam Should Not Have Fallen, given how it is
written. Professional historians of the war will be unsatisfied
as Joes provides little that has not already been said in the
other works he cites. There are no new sources brought to
light here, no new archival discoveries, no correspondences
recently discovered, nor any other documentary revelations. The real value this book provides to historians will
be its grist for debate, further research, and far weightier
published argument and counterargument. One imagines
a slew of master’s degree theses and PhD dissertations
inspired by Professor Joes’ conclusions herein.
One should also keep in mind other worthwhile scholarly treatments the author chose not to use, or, if he did use
others, perhaps he decided not to list them in his references.
Discerning scholars will no doubt notice that works that
disagree with the author’s assumptions and conclusions are
missing. For example, John Prados’ book on the Ho Chi
Minh Trail was consulted; his other books on the Vietnam
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War, among them The Hidden History of the Vietnam War
and Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 19451975, apparently were not. Just comparing the title of the
latter work with the argumentative thrust of Why South
Vietnam Fell, one can easily guess why.
Finally, we finish with the ugly. This book should have
been an entry point for new students of the Vietnam War,
given how it synthesizes much current scholarship, eloquently articulates a stimulating viewpoint, and provides
good recommendations for further reading in the notes
to the text. But, it costs eighty-five dollars retail. As of this
writing, no paperback or e-book at significantly less cost is
available. It is hard to imagine readers buying one of their
first books on the Vietnam War at such a high price. The
larger military academic and university librari