Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 57

CAVALRY

way, the Bradley-equipped cavalry scouts and tankers
of the ABCT together would adopt the sole mantle of
heavy cavalry.
Within heavy cavalry, effective force development and employment require specific preparation
within a typically offense- and defense-focused
mission-essential task list. However, a decade of
general employment has meant that preparations for
large-scale decisive-action missions have suffered.
Additionally, as noted by Sgt. Maj. (retired) Derek
McCrea, “the ABCT priority over the past decade
has not included repetitive and traditional Bradley
gunnery, maintenance, and maneuver training due
to repeat deployments on nonstandard vehicles
(MRAPs, etc.).”18 By muddying the waters between
light and heavy cavalry, we have created broadly
focused and less technically proficient formations.
In order to build and maintain a heavy cavalry
mentality focused around the characteristics of
the offense—surprise, concentration, audacity, and
tempo—we must necessarily employ light and heavy
cavalry squadrons in roles specific to their composition and core competencies. Our problem, reinforced
by current doctrine, is that we tend to assume that
capabilities are virtually the same across all types of
cavalry squadrons.
As seen in the table on page 52, current cavalry
squadron mission profiles do not distinguish between
most of the various, differently composed formations,
thereby promoting employment for the same kinds of
missions.19 We may improve our force by instead recognizing and harmonizing existing capabilities and limitations and making the ABCT heavy cavalry our primary
fighting cavalry—a hunter-killer force capable of becoming decisively engaged when necessary and of being the
tip of the spear in a forcible-entry fight into another
country. Upon clearing the ground of armored threats,
this force would be followed by a force of SBCT or IBCT
infantry and light cavalry units in a primarily wide area
security role, with decentralized scouts acquiring urban
and low-intensity targets, gathering information, and developing the situation for their offense-focused infantry
and heavy cavalry brethren.
Conclusion
The Army would do well to remember the French
knights at Agincourt who rode forth tall, proud, and
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2015

(Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

Portrait of Brig. Gen. John Buford (Maj. Gen. from 1 July
1863), officer of the Union Army

The Decisive Role of Cavalry
at Gettysburg

T

he Union Army’s First Cavalry Division provided us
with a classic example of the effective use of cavalry
when it successfully accomplished traditional cavalry
missions during the Battle of Gettysburg. In mid-June 1863,
division commander Brig. Gen. John Buford was given the
mission to find, impede, and collect intelligence on the
Confederate Army, commanded by Gen. Robert E. Lee.
The Confederate forces had crossed north into
Pennsylvania, but their exact location was unknown.
However, on 30 June 1863, cavalrymen from Buford’s force
found the lead elements of Lee’s army just west of the small
town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Buford immediately
reported this via courier to the commanding officer on
the field, Maj. Gen. John Reyn olds, who ordered the bulk
of the Union forces to begin prompt movement toward
Gettysburg. In the meantime, Buford directed his force of
about three thousand cavalrymen to seize the high ground
overlooking the approaches to Gettysburg ahead of
Confederate forces. Initially, Buford’s cavalry, fighting as light
infantry, caused Lee’s army to deploy prematurely into fighting formations before it had fully concentrated its forces. This
successfully helped delay the Confederate army’s progress
until the full complement of Union forces had arrived under
overall commander Maj. Gen. George Meade. Subsequently,
Buford’s cavalry conducted relentless mounted reconnaissance missions that gave Union senior leaders accurate and
detailed intelligence of Confederate force movements and
dispositions.
Many historians regard the actions of Buford’s cavalry at the outset of the engagement as perhaps the most
important single factor that shaped the situation and
enabled the Union Army to win the Battle of Gettysburg.
Despite the passage of years and dramatic advances in
equipment and technology, it is easy to envision how
cavalry, both light and heavy, could play a similarly pivotal role in engagements fought under the conditions of
the current operating environments.

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