Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 105

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Second, among those one million eighteen-year-olds
qualified to serve but unwilling (top left), policy makers
must devise means for incentivizing such service by
aligning the desires of the unwilling with national interests, of which a high quality military is one.
Third, steps must be taken to qualify those willing to
serve but who today cannot fully qualify (bottom right).
To enhance the process, the military must develop more
refined methodologies for a talent-spotting and vetting
process, akin to what Special Forces employ to identify
and select their talent today. For example, the Junior
Officer Reserve Corps programs provide both a history
and a mechanism that could help such an effort.
Fourth, and finally, the military should employ its
legacy tools for continuing to pursue and attract the
already high-quality, highly motivated young people
the Nation seeks today (top right). Though many of
such talented young men and women want to serve in
the military, they still need to be actively recruited, or
many will be enticed by agents of other organizations
who put forth the interest and effort to recruit them.
An approach that proceeds along these four lines
of effort can arrest and then reverse the drift toward
fewer and fewer qualified and willing young men
and women by expanding the pool of those qualified
and willing to serve the Nation, both in military and
civilian capacities. In doing so, the AVF’s enlisted talent
requirements are more likely to receive long-term, sustainable support from both society and the military, as
well as political leaders. More detailed proposals with
development of appropriate ways and means along
these four lines of effort are still needed. Due to space
limitations, this article has only identified the challenges and suggested starting points for broader and deeper
analysis leading to a redesign of the AVF.

Conclusion
Divergent military, societal, and political forces risk
the AVF’s future viability. Although America likes its

volunteer force, the military is attempting to drive it
to higher quality through recruitment even as society
is showing it will not sustain the military’s steady call
for volunteers. To be sure, many dedicated and experienced leaders in DOD, Congress, and across society
have and will continue to support the AVF. But few
are aware of, or acknowledge, the degree and power of
current tensions on the AVF’s foundational structures.
The DOD commitment to conduct a holistic review
of the AVF is a necessary start. However, national
inattention thus far to recruitment of enlisted talent
risks reliance on quick fixes without addressing the
fundamental issues. Further analysis must integrate the
relationships among the military, the government, and
the society, with special focus on fiscal issues such as
pay and compensation.
U.S. political leaders are charged with managing these
tensions and forging practical solutions. In developing
a more long-term approach to the AVF’s enlisted talent acquisition, future efforts must be acceptable to key
stakeholders. They must assign responsibility, propose
objectives, and develop basic assessment tools to monitor
the AVF’s viability and account for changes in the broad
system. Redesigning the future AVF must begin at the
beginning: with the young men and women who join the
ranks. All those involved with DOD talent acquisition
effort must pitch in: military, societal, and political leaders.
The call for a redesign of America’s AVF is timely; the
very life of today’s high-quality force is at stake. Time,
however, is not our ally. Our nation needs a concerted,
whole-of-nation approach to successfully complete a
reform of the AVF. The solution must account for the
pervasive problems, especially with enlisted talent
acquisition, without killing what makes the military so
venerated and potent today. Those undertaking this task
should gain encouragement in this: Americans can agree
they want their all-volunteer force, and they want it
healthy and good and strong for the long haul. For the
force’s redesign, this is a solid foundation.

Col. Michael Runey, U.S. Army, is the director of the Security Force Assistance Center (CJ-35) in Headquarters
Resolute Support (NATO) in Kabul, Afghanistan. He educated cadets in military history at the U.S. Military
Academy, served as professor of military science at Pennsylvania State University, and served on the commander’s
initiatives group at U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Experience gained in raising and educating the all-volunteer
force served as the catalyst for his research at the Army War College.
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