Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 94

2nd Platoon

1st Platoon
Barnes

3rd Platoon
Eton

Aran

Kane

Fells

Teeps
Jackson

Neebles
Parker

Hightower
Kellogg

Directed ties indicating sellers and buyers of methamphetamines
Relationship Data
Barnes
Aran
Nodal out-degree: 8
Nodal in-degree: 3
Degree centrality: .8
Degree prestige: .3
Eton
Neebles
Nodal out-degree: 3
Nodal in-degree: 2
Degree centrality: .3
Degree centrality: .2
Teeps
Nodal out-degree: 2
Degree centrality: .2

Key
Arrows point from sellers to buyers
g (network size) = 11
Out-degree = The number of soldiers to whom an individual sold
drugs
In-degree = The number of soldiers from whom an individual bought
drugs
Degree centrality = n/(g-1) = measure of prominence (1.0 maximum)
Degree prestige = n/(g-1) = measure of prominence (1.0 maximum)

Figure 1. Affiliation Network (Drug Selling)
information he describes as context and background:
where the soldiers live in relation to each other, where
the drugs and paraphernalia were found, and what
were the various overlapping details provided in some
sworn statements. Your sergeant major pipes in with
detailed recall of the squads, sections, and platoons to
which the suspects are assigned and ably summarizes
previous overlapping criminal histories of some of the
suspects.
On scrap paper from your desk, you begin sketching
out the lines of relationships between the suspects, and
you juxtapose that interconnected web against their
background characteristics. Unexpectedly, you begin
to see visual patterns of influence and power emerge
on the page—patterns that do not reflect traditional presumptions of who is leading whom astray. You
wonder if this exercise would help you make the right
disciplinary decision in each case in a way that more
holistically accounts for the second and third order
consequences you were just imagining. For instance,
one course of action—such as a court-martial with
a cap on confinement, to spur a swift offer to plead
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guilty—would be better than another (say, indiscriminate nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice for all soldiers in the
ring) if that course of action would have a domino-like
deterrent effect in this social network of drug use and
distribution.
Such an effect could either stem the repeated offenses or allow the subordinate commanders to use a
targeted disciplinary choice on a particularly influential
hub in order to nudge or shepherd the more easily led
(or misled) individuals in the right direction. Choosing
one course of action over another, therefore, has implications for the substantive equity of the disciplinary
action, as well as for the command’s allocation of investigative resources and attention.43
Such a scenario is not only hypothetical, but it was
employed by a brigade and battalion commander to
more efficiently, fairly, and robustly address a drug distribution ring infesting a particular company deployed
to Iraq during combat operations.44
Figures 1 and 2 represent two layers of data drawn
from the law enforcement investigation into that
November-December 2014  MILITARY REVIEW