Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 83

OPERATION SERVAL

A rapid reaction time for Army units traveling significant distances was
possible because—
λλThe alert system (Guépard) enabled rapid deployment of French units despite challenges of establishing joint cooperation in the first few days of deployment
λλThe legacy fleet of aging vehicles held up over long distances and rugged terrain due to the skills of
their designers, drivers, and crews

Figure 4. Main Lessons Learned From the Second Part of Phase 0
a French advising and liaison team, took back the city
of Konna (700 km to the east). In addition, the first
African contingents from Nigeria, Togo, and Benin
landed in Bamako.
On 20 January, another company of GTIA 1
seized the airfield at Sévaré, after a 640 km road
march from the aerial port of debarkation. The next
day, Malian forces took Douentza (800 km from
Bamako), while GTIA 2 finished boarding the landing ship Dixmude for its seaborne deployment to the
seaport of debarkation in Dakar, Senegal.
Makeup of units. The brigade headquarters, as
well as GTIAs 2 and 3, were generated by the 3rd
Mechanized Brigade, on Guépard alert. They were deployed partly by sea and partly by military transport
aircraft (Boeing C-17s) from allied forces or leased
civilian Antonov aircraft. GTIA 2 is based in the
92nd Infantry Regiment, which had brand new eightwheeled infantry fighting vehicles (véhicules blindés de
combat d’infanterie, or VBCIs). GTIA 3 is an armored
cavalry unit that was pulled from the 1st Marine
Cavalry Regiment, equipped with light six-wheeled
reconnaissance vehicles (AMX-10RCs) heavily armed
with 105 mm guns.
The remaining GTIA 4 was formed by the 2nd
Foreign Legion Airborne Regiment (Regiment
Étranger de Parachutistes) reinforced by the
1st Airborne Regiment (Regiment de Chasseurs
Parachutistes) and other assets from the 11th
Airborne Brigade. Given the huge distances in theater, a logistics battalion and a signal unit were also
committed.
For the next three days, GTIA 1 reinforced its positions on the line between Diabaly and Konna, while
the rear echelon in Bamako consolidated the logistics
and command and control of the operation.
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2014

Lessons from phase 0, blocking the jihadists.
This phase validated the Guépard alert system, with a
whole brigade in France on alert and ready to provide
forces within hours of notification. The reaction time
was excellent for army units despite some early difficulties establishing coordination among joint agencies.
The legacy fleet of aging vehicles (four-wheeled
armored personnel carriers called véhicules de l’avant
blindé and light armored vehicles—the ERC 90s)
proved their ruggedness in the grueling approach
march, some vehicles driving more than 2,000 km in
10 days on African roads.
As some vehicles were older than their crews, it
was a tribute to their skilled designers, drivers, and
maintenance teams that they were able to carry out
the mission. (Figure 4 summarizes the main lessons
learned from the second part of phase 0, in which forces blocked the jihadists.)

Phase 1, Seizing the Niger Bend
(21 January to 1 February 2013)
On 25 January, GTIA 1 moved north toward
Timbuktu and Gao, relieved in place by the first
African-led International Support Mission to Mali
troops (a Togolese unit in Mopti and a Burkinabe unit
in Markala). Avoiding contact but harassed by air
assets, the jihadist armed groups (groupes armés djihadistes) withdrew to the north and east of Gao. French
elements were airlifted to Gao Airport and secured it
in spite of a stiff resistance by MOJWA elements.
On 27 January, GTIA 1 and Malian troops secured the town of Timbuktu without any resistance. A
company from GTIA 4 was air-dropped north of the
town to cut possible escape routes. GTIA 2 debarked
at Dakar and started the 2,000-km journey to the east
toward Gao.
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