Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 52

of the 2nd Infantry Division, noted, “If anything, the
emphasis we’ve placed on this mission and on training
for it has highlighted how far yet we have to go.”7 The
complexities inherent in CWMD missions run the full
spectrum: from policy issues that have the potential to
affect tactical operations, to materiel gaps, to emerging
doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Tactical CWMD Challenges
Tactical CWMD operations pose unique challenges to maneuver forces. First, conventional forces
tasked with CWMD may not necessarily own their
operational area. Those forces may have a requirement
to isolate, seize, and secure certain facilities; yet, they
could be required to coordinate—gain permission
of allies—to move through friendly operational
areas to the specified objective. Units can expect to
execute passages of lines across each individual alliance unit boundary to their assigned objective area.
Therefore, each phase of a CWMD mission may be
conducted in an environment where movement is
constrained by the speed and quality of coordination with the terrain owner. Additionally, operational areas, designated by allied or coalition units,
are small enough to effectively limit the effects a
commander can employ inside them.
A unit that does not own the terrain may be executing CWMD operations within another force’s
operational area, with a lack of compatible communications systems, and with friendly units comprised largely of an amalgam of survivors from former jihadist formations that the United States spent
over a decade fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
is the scenario that Army conventional forces could
face in a number of places throughout the Middle
East and North Africa today.
In contrast, although the 2nd Infantry Division
would operate in an environment where it has
lived and trained for over 60 years, the process of
coordinating movement and operations is uniquely complex and challenging. This coordination
requires a minimum of five combat support liaison
teams, each composed of 20 to 25 soldiers, embedded with five different ROK Army corps headquarters. These teams are not standard table-of-organization-and-equipment elements, which requires
the division to create them from within the staff.
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During combat operations, the division would likely reduce its staff by more than 100 personnel to meet these
liaison requirements.
The 2nd Infantry Division headquarters is able to
train for this coordination routinely through a robust
annual exercise program. Two theater exercises and
one to two division command post exercises afford the
division the ability to train with its ROK Army partners. Additionally, echelons from platoon to brigade
headquarters routinely train with ROK Army units,
further building the common understanding necessary
for interoperability. This would not be the case with
a contingency CWMD operation in another theater.
Units should prepare to create liaison teams to support

November-December 2014  MILITARY REVIEW