Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 36
a consensus regarding the inability of the BFSB to satisfy their reconnaissance and security requirements.22
They sought a combined arms organization capable of
obtaining and evaluating information through direct
interaction with a threat or civilian populace, possessing the means to fight for it if necessary. Its security
role was summarized as “to provide early warning,
identify opportunities, and prevent premature deployment of main body formations.”23 In essence, these
Army leaders sought a more robust organization capable of operations in a complicated and chaotic battlefield environment against a variety of threats.
The crafting of an effective reconnaissance and
security brigade organization provides the stimulus and
justification for restoring traditional security missions
to reconnaissance doctrine. The planned brigades are
intended to operate as part of early entry and forcible
entry operations. Unlike the BFSB, they will possess
combat power combined with information collection
and assessment capabilities. They are intended to operate forward and in close proximity to hostile forces,
achieving their objectives through combat if necessary.
The new brigade must be imbued with the mindset
and experiences of a cavalry organization. To achieve
this and leverage fully their capabilities requires coherent doctrine that restores the clear linkage between
security and reconnaissance missions. The two are not
mutually exclusive, but interwoven. Reconnaissance by
its nature provides information and early warning of
threats to help prevent the parent force from being surprised, a point expressed in manuals such as FM 17-97:
“Reconnaissance keeps the follow-on force from being
surprised or interrupted, and protects it against losing
soldiers and equipment on the way to the objective.”24
Indeed, “even during security missions that involve
fighting the enemy, the scouts’ primary task remains
gathering information.”25 This relationship flows naturally from the forward and mobile presence of cavalry
on the battlefield.
For the planned reconnaissance and security brigades, doctrine must provide the guidance for active
screen, guard, and cover missions. These missions must
become part of the unit METLs and become central to
their training. Continuing to ignore such missions or
lump them into the general categories of area security
and force protection will hamstring the new organizations before they are fielded, with a concomitant
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impact on cavalry squadrons and the new standard
scout platoons. Units will be called on to execute these
missions with or without doctrinal coverage. The difference is that a reconnaissance and security unit with
no experience, understanding, or training in screen,
guard, and cover missions will do so at a considerable
cost in men, materiel, and time.
Alternately, scouts will simply not perform these
security missions, endangering themselves and their
parent organizations. The first decisive action training environment rotation conducted at the National
Training Center in March 2012 included the execution
of an offensive mission by an armored BCT. The unit’s
reconnaissance squadron ably supported this operation,
but upon its conclusion failed to transition into a security mission. The opposing force exploited the absence
of a screen line and related active security measures to
inflict heavy losses on the BCT and its tactical operations center. Analysis of this defeat underscored the
critical linkage between reconnaissance and security:
Reconnaissance squadrons must set conditions for future operations. There is no
rest for the weary. The squadron, although
significantly fatigued following the reconnaissance phase of the ABCT [armored brigade
combat team] operation, should have transitioned immediately to provide security for
the ABCT, allowing the rest of the brigade to
prepare for future operations.26
The Army currently retains soldiers of all ranks
with experience and knowledge of how to execute
screen, guard, and cover missions. This knowledge base
will not remain in the Army indefinitely, but it can be
tapped now to end the doctrinal dispersion of security.
A doctrinal reset is necessary to ensure that time-proven cavalry missions and principles are retained and
readily accessible to every commander, staff officer,
noncommissioned officer, and soldier without undertaking an exhaustive literature search.
Conversely, surveillance needs to return to its
proper role as a subordinate, enabling function. These
measures will ensure that reconnaissance and security
organizations possess the doctrinal tools necessary to
achieve success on the next battlefield and avoid self-inflicted capability failure before the first shot of the next
conflict is fired.
Scouts out!
November-December 2014 MILITARY REVIEW