Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 32

suited the Stryker brigade’s orientation on small-scale
Standoff information collection from light platforms
contingencies, where the importance of understanding
proved unrealistic in a confused operational area,
human terrain outweighed that of security missions
characterized by a series of movements to contact and
against a conventional military threat.4 The RSTA
the occurrence of sudden, sharp encounters with Iraqi
squadron could establish a screen trace to cover the
conventional and paramilitary forces. Commanders
brigade’s flank or rear. However, lacking combat power,
questioned the validity of standoff reconnaissance and
it relied on friendly combat assets to cope with aggresthe doctrine it had spawned. Analysis of operations
sive threats and to execute cover and guard missions.
found that “commanders chose not to employ scouts
Instead, primary security missions associated with the
and brigade reconnaissance troops in the role for
squadron included convoy escort and area security.5
which they were intended.”9
RSTA squadron concepts soon began to shape
Instead of RSTA concepts, they sought increased
doctrine for all reconnaissance organizations. In 2002,
survivability and broadened capability for their rea new field manual (FM) applied principles intended
connaissance organizations, particularly the ability to
for the subordinate RSTA troop
to the reconnaissance troop of the
maneuver BCT.6 A platoon manual
published the same year consolidated doctrine for the multiple reconnaissance and scout platoons then
in existence. The result reflected
the dominance of RSTA concepts.
Reconnaissance was emphasized,
but security reflected the passive
screen, convoy escort, and general
area security outlined for the RSTA
squadron and troop.7
Conversely, doctrine for those
organizations specifically designed
to execute the full range of reconnaissance, security, and economy
of force operations lapsed. The
capstone doctrine for the armored
cavalry regiment and the division
cavalry squadron, for example,
remained in FM 17-95, Cavalry
Operations. The last version of this
manual was published in 1996.
Even the onset of overseas combat
operations in 2001 failed to trigger
updates to this manual.8
While detailed doctrinal guidance for the execution of traditional security missions languished,
Tanks and armored cavalry assault vehicles from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment form
reconnaissance units went to war.
The 2003 march to Baghdad quick- a defensive perimeter at a bridge site in Vietnam during 1970 operations in Cambodia.
The distance between the vehicles was much less than armor doctrine stated because of
ly called into question the wisdom
the need for mutual support and to prevent infiltration.
of the new contact paradigm.
(Department of the Army photo)
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November-Dece mber 2014  MILITARY REVIEW