Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 26

food, water, obstacle material, medical packages,
weapons, replacement radios, and life-support equipment would become less frequent. Forward-deployed
echelons would have greater flexibility to conduct
operations in any contingency.
Apart from the justifications offered above, the
major advantage of integrating a reasonable number
of the proposed vehicles into rifle battalions moves
beyond enabling and logistical aspects of operations
and directly into combat application. Serving as a
kind of mobile firebase, these platforms and their
ability to offer protected machine-gun and antitank
fires transform the traditional infantry platoon into
a far more impactful fighting unit. While infantry
always will retain its primary purpose of delivering
assault teams to defeat an enemy at close quarters, the
organic option of fixing or attacking with mounted
elements would be a significant combat multiplier.
Similarly, with increased ability to transport mortar
systems to direct support of tactical operations, rifle
companies could upgrade from their current 60 mm
mortars to 120 mm, the caliber currently enjoyed by
their reconnaissance counterparts. Barring that, at a
minimum, rifle companies would be far more lethal
due to their enhanced ability to emplace organic,
indirect, crew-served weapons of any caliber without
the time and human limitations resulting from having
to transport mortar tubes and rounds on the backs of
soldiers.
Due to improved situational awareness, sustainment, and lethality, the motorized rifle battalion
would become far more versatile when trained and
given the option of integrating motorized transport.
In addition, each light company could structure mobile quick-response forces by task-organizing mounted
sections. As a result, companies would operate with
far more self-reliance—though with added logistical
constraints—and would be equipped to carry the
panoply of equipment now needed to meet complex
challenges.
Moreover, vehicle distribution throughout the
light formations would negate the need for the heavy
weapons company now in the IBCT structure, which
is the only mobile combat element in rifle battalions.
However, the company is incapable of efficient troop
transport with HMMWVs. Instead, each motorized rifle company would have similar firepower
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and mobility, combined with traditional infantry
strengths.6 Similar to the proven utility of Stryker
formations, the revamped IBCT would offer the best
of both worlds: maximally equipped shock troops that
get to the battlefield much more efficiently and quickly, but still retain the indispensable qualities that only
assaulting infantry provide.

Increased Land Power Dominance
The second major effect of empowering IBCTs
with integrated and protected ground mobility lies in
the operational dimension at higher echelons. Since
light infantry, both ground and aerial, will comprise
42 percent of the Army’s maneuver brigades, they are
a potential strategic liability when the United States is
pressed to deploy heavier, large-scale combat power to
achieve sustained land dominance. While campaigns
November-December 2014  MILITARY REVIEW