Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 143

BOOK REVIEWS Hay to be actively involved in government without appearing to be angling for a job. Eventually he landed a short ambassadorship to England, followed by his appointment as secretary of state. The story is not one of hero worship, nor does it get bogged down as a recital of Hay’s many accomplishments. The author exposes and examines Hay’s myriad professional and intimate personal connections and friendships. We read of his love for not one, but two, married woman of prominence. The letters between Hay’s intimates themselves and to Hay provide a depth of character expertly captured by Taliaferro. Of note in this excellent work is the chapter concerning the time during Hay’s absence from government. The chapter outlining this phase of Hay’s life contains a volume of correspondence that depicts his internal struggle; from feeling as though he has not done enough to uphold Lincolnian principles, to feeling that he has done everything he could. This is actually the book’s strength, as it allows the reader to feel the weight of Hay’s personal struggle to find his place across the century. This book is of relevance to the security community in that it paints a very intimate picture of an individual in a position to have a vast impact on worldly affairs. Overall it is an excellent, enlightening, and entertaining read. Maj. Joshua B. Jordan, U.S. Army, Fort Lee, Virginia BROTHERS IN ARMS: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979 Andrew Mertha, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2014, 175 pages, $29.95 I n the center of Cambodia is the former Democratic Kampuchea military airfield at Krang Leav. Built with Chinese money and technical expertise, it was the crown jewel of Chinese foreign aid to the short-lived Khmer Rouge regime (19751979). Before becoming operational, the airfield was overrun by neighboring Vietnamese troops in 1979. Looking at a long-abandoned airfield in 2010, author Andrew Mertha wonders what exactly did this aid buy the Chinese? In Brothers in Arms Mertha, a political MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2014 scientist and university professor, examines China’s foreign aid to Democratic Kampuchea (DK). This leads him to the greater question of “Why was a powerful state like China unable to influence its far weaker and ostensibly dependent client state?” In his detailed analysis, Mertha quickly sets forth a persuasive and interesting argument that Chinese aid bought little in the way of influencing the policies of the DK government, despite being that regime’s only patron. He attributes this outcome principally to two reasons. The first, and most important to his argument, revolves around Chinese bureaucratic fragmentation in its foreign aid policy development and execution. Rather than rational decision making, it was institutional restraints, most notably in communication and lines of authority, that drove policy. Second, DK’s secretive, complex, and in many cases fratricidal internal institutions were paradoxically able to resist Chinese influence and, at the same time, remain ill equipped to take advantage of Chinese aid. To highlight his argument, Mertha uses three case studies that examine aid related to military, infrastructure, and trade projects. A vivid picture emerges of this almost unknown foreign aid program that kept the DK government afloat, helping the reader understand the ultimately counterintuitive patron-client state relationship. These case studies provide deeper insight on governance in Democratic Kampuchea, going beyond the well-documented subject of the “killing fields.” Why is all of this important? Mertha makes the case that an assessment of the China’s foreign aid to DK, especially regarding bureaucratic politics and processes, helps us better understand China’s inevitable attempts to expand her influence in Southeast Asia through “seductive, no strings attached” foreign aid. This is relevant since the author posits not much has changed with China’s institutional fragmentation in their current foreign aid programs. Finally, this book provokes further reflection on the dynamics and expected outcomes of any nation’s foreign aid program. This slim volume is well documented. The author used Cambodian and Chinese archival documents, including those from the Cambodian commission currently investigating the policies and practices of the Khmer Rouge regime, as well as interviews of Chinese experts who worked in DK and Cambodian survivors of the regime. Filled with great detail, the book 141