Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 140

She believes that the U.S. has misunderstood the
security situation from the outset and that its initial approach was actually helping the Taliban. The approach
changed when Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Gen.
David Petraeus adjusted the U.S. focus to counterinsurgency and protecting civilians, but, by then, the damage
had been done and the Taliban were entrenched.
Despite this, Gall concludes her work by stating
that the Afghan security forces are not up to the
task of keeping the “Taliban at bay,” and that U.S.
and NATO “cannot walk away” until the security of
the Afghanistan population “is ensured.” How that is
supposed to be done is not addressed, but this book is
still relevant on several levels: it provides an excellent
overview of the Afghanistan’s recen Ё