Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 14

reductions should be weighed carefully against realistic
requirements and associated risks, and that options for
maintaining a capable armor force be thoroughly explored based on the viability of extending and revitalizing the remaining Abrams.3
Over the decades since the Abrams was first fielded,
several technologies have been advancing that should
be examined as potential enhancements to extend the
useful life of the Abrams. Specifically, technologies for
engines and small precision munitions have advanced
greatly since the fielding of the first M1 in 1980. Given
today’s strategic and fiscal environments, most would
consider development of a new-generation main battle
tank beyond reach, with any such initiative destined to
suffer the same fate as the ambitious Future Combat
System (FCS), which was cancelled in 2009 because it
was deemed too expensive. That is why pursuing the
more modest option of upgrading existing Abrams
with new-engine and precision-munition technologies
deserves close scrutiny. These technologies could offer
enhancements to the Abrams that would extend its
useful lifespan well into the future to meet a variety
of foreseeable challenges within manageable fiscal
resources. Moreover, these technologies may offer tactical synergies when combined with each other and the
existing capabilities resident on the Abrams to meet
unforeseen requirements. Simulation and experimentation could play a key role in modeling and exploring
the tactical implications of such improvements.
Therefore, this article focuses on the Abrams’ tactical utility as justification for pursuing such upgrades.
Technological maturity or engineering feasibility are
not investigated in depth other than to identify technological trends that appear to match up with desirable enhancements to the Abrams. While technology
and engineering questions are certainly critical to the
fielding of new equipment, a better understanding of
tactical utility must precede such discussions. No sense
in perfecting the useless.

are gradual rather than abrupt, and with good reason.
Even as it becomes apparent that some new technology has a brighter future than an existing one, it often
takes some time before the tipping point of obsolescence is reached for older technologies. Very often
the overlap of time enables the older technology to
serve well beyond that point in some revised role. For
example, battleships served as key fire support platforms for U.S. amphibious operations in World War II
and later conflicts long after they had ceased to be the
preeminent naval warfare system. In another example, the Air Force’s B-52 Stratofortress, which was first
introduced into service in 1952 as a strategic bomber
capable of attacking deep targets in the Soviet Union
with nuclear payloads, continues to serve well as a
stand-off weapons platform and as a loitering closeair-support platform in low-threat environments,
decades after losing its ability to penetrate sophisticated integrated air defenses. Planned upgrades to
its systems now take its anticipated lifespan out to

A U.S. Marine Corps M1A1 Abrams tank fires
into a building after Marines were fired upon
during a firefight in Fallujah, Iraq, in support of
Operation al Fajr (New Dawn), 10 December
2004. The M1A1 was assigned to the 2nd Tank
Battalion, 1st Marine Division.
(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. James J. Vooris)

Enduring Need for the Main Battle
Tank
There are two key questions: “Do we still need a
main battle tank?” If so, “Will the Abrams serve the
purpose in the future?”
Before considering these, it is useful to observe
that transitions between classes of weapons usually
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November-December 2014  MILITARY REVIEW