Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 132

military forces as they were arming to commit genocidal acts.
The story serves as an incredible tale from the most
powerful representative of the U.N. and Western society
who personally witnessed repeated, vicious violations
of human rights during the Rwandan genocide. One of
Dallaire’s prominent themes is that powerful nations
must decide whether they will waive the justification for
intervention based on national interests, and instead become involved in foreign affairs based on humanitarian
concerns. He provides insight into the severe complications that arise for world leaders as they must consider
the consequences of their decisions.
A passionate human rights advocate and critic of
the U.N. as well as U.S. policy toward Rwanda during
the unfolding events, Samantha Powers, wrote the
foreword for this book. Although her accounts of the
U.N. and U.S. failure to intervene are strongly supported with facts, her argument that they failed in their
duty to intervene does not consider other perspectives
and the associated rationale behind the actions of all
parties which were involved. Moreover, her sympathetic approach to Dallaire’s story is one-sided and she
does not acknowledge other conditions that may have
influenced the international community’s decision not
to intervene.
In contrast, journalist Gil Courtemanche opines
that fault for the outcome lies in part with Dallaire
who, he asserts, was too methodical and did not possess
adequate initiative or the critical thinking required of
an effective UNAMIR commander.1 However, this
analysis is also incomplete in that it does not explore the
possibility the U.N. may have selected Dallaire for the
operation precisely because he was a senior officer who
followed orders and would not go outside the parameters set for him in Rwanda. The U.N. may have considered the potential damages caused by a commander
who was likely to intervene in Rwanda’s affairs without
permission and then intentionally selected Dallaire
because he was not likely to oppose orders. The second
and third order effects of the U.N.’s decisions not to intervene did not have a positive result in Rwanda for the
international community; however, the decision does
not imply the staff did not carefully consider the impact
of the selection for a commander.
Contrary to Courtemanche’s position that Dallaire
was naive in his comprehension of the UN’s intentions
130

during the incidents of violence, Dallaire explained
his high level of awareness during the entire operation.
Throughout the work, Dallaire reflects on his weaknesses, clearly explaining his perspective at the time of
the atrocities and comparing it to his view in hindsight,
a year later.
Others have found value in the Dallaire’s account
for the lessons it may hold for policy makers and commanders faced with similar circumstances involving
mass ethnic conflict in the future. Historians Frank
Kalesnik and Bruce Vandervort express a compelling
argument regarding the book, noting it is important
to consider whether the U.S. and U.N. have taken any
lessons forward from the tragic ending in the Rwandan
genocide.2
Although the answers to these speculations are not
provided in the book, Dallaire’s candid assessments can
be used to train and prepare future leaders and troops
at all levels on how to handle situations they may
encounter while working in such environments. With
consideration of Dallaire’s personal testimony, the U.N.
and governments of associated nation states can gain
valuable insight as to what can occur without Western
intervention within a nation plagued by turmoil.
As Dallaire suggests, intervention may on the one
hand deter perpetrators from further action. However,
on the other hand, intervention may result in escalated acts of war which may involve more than the local
governments and rebel forces.
The topic of mass atrocities is a relevant one in the
contemporary environment, and Dallaire’s personal
testimony as detailed in this book serves as a valuable
resource for decision-makers in the international
community.
Maj. Patricia C. Murphy, U.S. Army, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas

Notes
1. Gil Courtemanche, “The Nightmare Diaries,” The Guardian
(22 April 2005), [Review of the book Shake Hands with the Devil:
The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda by Romeo Dallaire], http://
www.theguardian.com/books/2005/apr/23/highereducation.
news3.
2. Frank Kalesnik and Bruce Vandervort, “Shake Hands with
the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda,” The Journal of
Military History, (69)2 (2005), 608-609, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/3397464.
November-December 2014  MILITARY REVIEW