Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 117

NO SHORTAGE OF CAMPFIRES

an axiom of German ace Adolph Galland, it is fair to
state that an army trying to train for everything trains
for nothing.28 So instead, an army must be able to
adapt. In light of future resource constraints, the Army
certainly realizes it cannot train toward every contingency; it must, however, train to adapt in order to react
to every contingency. To do so, it must focus on one
particular capability or skill that enhances adaptability
and allows flexibility.
The Army, like other services, must embrace a
medium, a concept, a theme. For example, the U.S. Air
Force long pursued the concept of centralized control
and decentralized execution. This specific tenet of airpower ultimately identified the Air Force as a genuine
stand-alone service.29 It led to the exclusivity of the Air
Force in a specific medium. For its part, the U.S. Navy
boldly states it will “provide offshore options to deter,
influence, and win in an era of uncertainty.”30 Certainly,
terrain and the occupation thereof, still matter. But it is
a very chaotic terrain. Nevertheless, that is the Army’s
domain as espoused by the Army chief of staff with his
accurate assessment that the operational security environment is “characterized by great complexity.”31
To manage operational complexity, the Army, as of
late, applies a planning process for operational design
(the Army design methodology).32 However, operational planning, including design, is a fairly large and
detailed process that hinges on something specific in
order to be useful. So, what is the one thing the Army
must grasp as the sine qua non—the thing that must be
understood lest the stick figure described above perish?
Certainly, a temptation to concentrate on an end state
might perhaps arise, but that would be incorrect.
Eisenhower provides the answer. In his book
Crusade in Europe, he was implementing design even
though he did not use that descriptor. More specifically, Eisenhower concentrates on the all-important idea
of operational COG, even though that specific term is
not mentioned once, or identified as such. For example, once the Army was able to gain a foothold on the
continent of Europe following Operation Overlord,
Eisenhower aptly describes what had to be attacked—
the “source of power.”33 He clearly states, “This purpose
of destroying enemy forces was always our guiding principle.”34 Throughout his book, every aspect of planning
hinged on that main point. In some respects Crusade in
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2014

Europe reads like a case study in design, even if current
design terminology—for example, COG—is absent.
The emphasis on the design process and operational
COG comes at an opportune time. After the fall of
the Soviet Union, the world evolved into an incredibly complex environment. Numerous theorists made
many attempts to describe it. Thomas H. Henriksen’s
pamphlet The New World Order succinctly and accurately captured the era, beginning with this chilling
prediction: “Unfortunately for the human race, war has
a future.”35 That rather bleak omen seemed out of place
at a time when champagne flowed in all the U.S. alert
facilities after President George H.W. Bush stood down
the nuclear deterrent force.36 Somewhat presciently,
Henriksen wrote his dire forewarning almost immediately after the stand down.37
More than two decades later, the Army likely agrees
Henriksen’s prediction proved true. As an article in
the Wall Street Journal ruefully reported recently, “the
dictators are back.”38 In that article, Bret Stephens poignantly posited how the mechanics of democracy are
not taking root as wished:
Maybe it’s something in the water. Or the
culture. Or the religion. Or the educational
system. Or the level of economic development. Or the underhanded ways in which
authoritarian leaders manipulate media and
suppress dissent.39
The words “culture” and “religion” stand out as
representing the kinds of challenging issues begging for
application of Army analytical and operational expertise so hard-earned over the past decades. The phrase
“underhanded ways” in particula "6