Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 74

the challenges of formulating a metric for definitively determining advisory achievement.34 Consequently, today’s
advisors use different methods to define advisory success.
Some of the following methods consistently emerge that
appear useful in gauging advisory success.
One informal test for defining advisory success is
summarized as, “Does it meet the standard of Iraqi (or
Afghan) good enough?”35 This informal approach—
though some may regard it as ethnocentrically patronizing or insensitive—actually reveals open-mindedness,
tolerance, flexibility, perspective-taking skills, and
overall situational awareness. It promotes understanding of performance standards appropriate for a given
counterpart and foreign security force based on their
own culturally nuanced conditions.
A second approach entails advisors who frame success as working themselves out of a job, meaning, “Have
they helped counterparts achieve a level of professional
competence and autonomy whereby counterparts no
longer need advisors?” This second method for defining success often manifests when advisors work with
counterparts against the deadline of the U.S. or coalition
military’s imminent withdrawal from a host nation,
such as in the latter phases of Iraq and Afghanistan.
A third approach is defining success by gauging the
strength of established relationships and friendships.
This is obviously an intangible measure of accomplishment in a mission that often lacks conspicuous, tangible,
and objective signs of progress. Nevertheless, in addition
to trying to apply classic (and sometimes obsessive)
objective, precise, and quantitative measures of success
(e.g., numbers of trained foreign troops or pieces of
equipment and weaponry issued), contemporary advisors often rely on subjective and qualitative estimates of
advisory success—which sometimes better fit the nebulous and unconventional nature of the military advising
mission.36 Finally, advisory success is only validated with
the test of time and the strength of continuing links
between the advisor and the counterpart after a given
advisory mission has ended. Signs of success may therefore take many years to become evident.

Conclusion
We have learned that many of the historical advising insights from previous conflicts ring true today,
although the information age and other contemporary developments create new complexities in the
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performance of this essential mission. As shown in the
historical and contemporary experiences discussed in
this article, military advisors require a sophisticated
array of skills; the pentathlete concept certainly applies
to successful military advisors.37 Advisors must cross
myriad cultural bridges to build trust with diverse people (including counterparts and linguists) so they can
succeed in their unconventional and complex mission.
The critical advisory skills required include warfighting and combat competence, subject matter expertise,
leadership (especially softer leader tools of influence
and persuasion), cognitive flexibility, diplomacy, agility,
an ability to rapidly learn and adapt on the job, and,
especially, cross-cultural competence.38
The future of military advising. As U.S. forces
withdraw from Afghanistan, the U.S. military is now
faced with the question of what will happen to its
advising mission, capabilities, and wealth of experience
accumulated over more than a decade of conflict in
which advisors played a vital role.
One forecast is that after the U.S. armed forces
depart Afgha