Military Review English Edition November-December 2013 | Page 89

O V E R CO M I N G A 2/ A D
that the “we’ll work it out when we get there,”
approach to warfare will yield undertrained, poorly
equipped, and ineffectually organized forces.

Counter-A2/AD Land Warfare
Forces—A Way Ahead

The descriptions in figures 2 and 3 are a place
to start but they tee up important force structure
questions. A balanced land warfare force structure
allows the United States to better protect its vital
interests. The argument for a balanced portfolio
of land warfare capabilities is rooted in more than
historical common sense and warfighting pragmatism; rather, it is grounded in a need to overcome
A2/AD adversaries from early assault to larger
entry operations. Getting the right balance of land
warfare forces equipment, training, and organization will take time; however, potential changes to
the current force structure ensures an Army with
a balanced range of competencies throughout the
future spectrum of war.
As land warfare forces’ access and freedom
of action improves in initial operations, entry
operations demand inclusion of other land warfare
forces. Crafting the initial concept of operations
and TTPs land warfare forces will need to successfully counter-A2/AD adversaries is a first step.
These restructuring efforts will demand America’s
largest training and experimentation venues where
air, space, cyberspace, electromagnetic, and naval
capabilities can be tested and honed until a robust
family of concept of operations and TTPs emerge.
While this redevelopment effort is too broad to call
it “Air (+ Maritime, Cyber, Space, Special Opera-

tions Forces)—Land Battle II,” it is appropriate to
call it what it is: The New Integrated Joint: CrossDomain Operations . . . with land warfare forces
in the fight.

What Do We Now Know?

We know that getting to the fight will be a
fight. We also know that getting into the fight
will be a fight. Staying in the fight will depend
on the degree to which the joint force is prepared
in steady state to operate and thrive amidst the
attempted chronic friction and chaos of A2/AD.
Anti-Access/Area Denial is not new; it weaves
itself into the historic fabric of warfare, but that
platitude entirely misses what a modern A2/AD
capability implies for projection of an expeditionary force.
More broadly, the reach, immediacy, and lethality of newer tactical systems are not just better
versions of what they replaced; instead, they will
fundamentally change the way we project force
and fight in future A2/AD conflicts. To effectively
mitigate A2/AD, U.S. land warfare forces must
be prepared to execute multiple missions. It is in
the role of reconnaissance, raids, and seizures that
land warfare forces will be of early benefit to overcome A2/AD and help carve out U.S. access, freedom of action, and operational latitude.9 America’s
previous warfighting brilliance cannot blind today’s
decision makers to the truth that military strength
is redefined and built anew in each era based on
the problems as they exist. In each era, forces for
freedom must endeavor to remain strongest, most
vigilant, most prepared, and most ready. MR

NOTES
1. Gen. Raymond Odierno, speech to students at the Command and General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 April 2013.
2. Ibid.
3. U.S. Department of Defense Joint Staff J7, Joint Operational Access Concept, 13. Note: within the JOAC text, “integrated” is explained as it is used in the
multi-service Air-Sea Battle concept to counter-A2/AD threats. However, elsewhere
in JOAC, “integrated” is used as both a characterization of adversary threat systems
and the needed U.S. Department of Defense response to military operations.

MILITARY REVIEW

• November-December 2013

4. U.S. Secretary of Defense, U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance, 4-5.
5. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept, U.S. Department of Defense, 22 November 2011, 8-13.
6. Ibid. ?#2?#B??r??&?B??2???&?B??3????&?B??#"??p???