Military Review English Edition November-December 2013 | Page 70

FM 3-24 devotes an entire chapter to discussing
the importance of integrating civilian and military
activities into counterinsurgency operations.2 It also
investigates how insurgents strive to disguise their
intentions, and when successful, make COIN operations extremely difficult. Insurgencies take many
different forms, and while each is unique, they tend to
share certain commonalities.3 Although the structure,
level of organization, and goals of each insurgent
group may vary, fundamental COIN principles are
applicable to all insurgent groups.
?? Identify insurgent motivations and depth of
commitment.4
?? Identify likely insurgent weapons and tactics.5
?? Identify the operational environment in which
insurgents seek to initiate and develop their campaign
and strategy.6
?? Stabilize the area of operation to facilitate the
local government’s ability to provide for the local
populace.7
?? Conduct education and information operations
targeting insurgents, victims, and potential victims.8

?? Train the indigenous government and security forces to conduct effective COIN operations
independently.9
Identify insurgent motivation and depth of
commitment. An insurgent’s level of commitment
and drive correlates to various motivating factors.
For example, a hardline Islamic extremist who is
motivated by a convoluted view of religious duty, a
hatred for Western culture, and disgust of the basic
concept of freedom will not negotiate.10 However,
myriad factors motivate large numbers of the local
population in Afghanistan to cooperate with insurgents. In many cases the Taliban intimidate the local
populace and coerce them into action by providing
or limiting certain resources or services. In many villages, the Taliban demand cooperation and support
from the population—resistance results in threats to
destroy homes, crops and livelihood, or even death.
Another motivating factor is economic necessity.
Afghan families typically depend on the men for
survival. Many of the men have no ideological
commitment to the insurgent cause, but monetary

Afghan National Policemen and U.S. Army soldiers from Task Force 3-66 Armor, 172d Infantry Brigade, from Grafenwoehr,
Germany, conduct training on small unit tactics at their joint combat outpost in Paktika, Afghanistan, 23 April 2012.

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November-December 2013

• MILITARY REVIEW