Military Review English Edition November-December 2013 | Page 60

Commander’s Intent and
Concept of Operations
Maj. Richard Dempsey, U.S. Army, and Maj. Jonathan M. Chavous, U.S. Army

I

Maj. Jonathan Chavous is currently
attending the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Va.
He holds a B.S. in Biology from the
University of S.C.
Maj. Rich Dempsey is currently attending the United Kingdom’s Advanced
Command and Staff College at the
Joint Service Command and Staff
College in England. He holds a B.S.
in building materials technology and
in management from the University of
Massachusetts.

PHOTO: Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry
Division, from Fort Riley, Kan., with
their Bradley Fighting Vehicles nearby,
make a security halt during training
at the National Training Center, Fort
Irwin, Calif., 20 February 2013. (David
Vergun, Army News Service)

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N 1990, RETIRED Lt. Gen. (then Col.) L.D. Holder wrote an article for
Military Review titled “Concept of the Operation—See Ops Overlay.”
In the article, Holder voiced his concerns that the Army was drifting away
from the standard field order and that leader focus had shifted away from
what was required to win a combined arms fight. Holder argued that an
over reliance on a rigid, methodical planning process and the relatively new
doctrinal addition of commander’s intent had left many orders without an
appropriate concept of operations paragraph and subsequently left subordinates without a clear understanding of the operation. In essence, leaders
were losing the balance between the “art” and the “science” of writing effective mission orders.
Over the past decade of persistent conflict, many Army leaders have again
distanced themselves from the “art” of effective orders production. Officers
have learned to create expert multi-paged concept of operations (CONOPs)
in electronic media as a tool to provide situational awareness to higher echelons and to assist in the allocation of resources. These CONOP slides rarely
convey the actual concept of the operation and usually consist of poorly
drawn intent symbols on satellite imagery and a task and purpose for each
element. While the slides have some utility, they never were intended to be
used as a briefing tool for company commanders and platoon leaders. Using
these products, instead of doctrinally complete mission orders, could lead to
a disjointed understanding of the concept of operations in a combined arms
fight. The undesired effect of this process has created a generation of officers
unfamiliar with the doctrinally correct way to wri te effective mission orders.
Multiple changes to doctrine over the last decade have contributed to a
lack of understanding. Although current doctrine clearly defines the contents
of the concept of operation paragraph, many leaders are guilty of relying on
knowledge acquired during the Captain’s Career Course or the Command and
November-December 2013

• MILITARY REVIEW