Military Review English Edition November-December 2013 | Page 39

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GROWING LEADERS

A Palestinian demonstrator throws stones toward Israeli forces during clashes over road closures in Kfar Kadum, West
Bank, 19 August 2011. “Fourth generation warfare” theorists like T.X. Hammes argue that, in the information age, “the sling
and the stone” can be more powerful than the tank, due to the ability of insurgents to undermine the perceived legitimacy
of a more powerful nation’s actions among this nation’s decision-makers.

others to our cause and way of life.”54 Thus, to Boyd,
just as important as morally influencing one’s own
side was exerting this influence upon an enemy and
this opponent’s base of popular support.
“Fourth generation warfare” theorists have
expressed views consistent with this tradition. They
argue that, thanks to information technology, today’s
insurgents can far more easily convince the political
decision makers of enemy nations “that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly
for the perceived benefit.”55 Insurgents do this by
undermining perceptions of the “legitimacy” of this
nation’s actions among international organizations,
this nation’s people, and the populations and leaders
of allied countries.56 (Noteworthy here is that Sun
Tzu’s moral concept of “justice” buttresses the political concept of “legitimacy.”)
Current U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine narrowly falls within this tradition. The doctrine states
that the greatest prize for either counterinsurgent or
MILITARY REVIEW

• November-December 2013

insurgent is the good opinion of the population they
wish to govern: “The primary struggle in an internal
war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political
control and legitimacy.”57
Army Doctrinal Publication 1, The Army, briefly
intersects this tradition, stating that the “moral-ethical
field” of conflict includes not just obeying laws, but
applying combat power in such a way as to meet the
expectations of America’s citizens.58 However, this
doctrine does not explore how soldiers are supposed
to fulfill Americans’ expectations—unless its discussion of institutional artifacts (the Oath of Service,
Soldier’s Creed, Army Civilian Creed, Warrior Ethos,
and Army Values) are assumed to be these means.
Peter Fromm, Kevin Cutright, and I are currently
writing within this tradition. We argue that, in an
increasingly “flat” world, information technology
enables warring parties to affect the perceptions and
moral judgments of all of a conflict’s key populations—their own troops, enemy forces, populations at
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