Military Review English Edition November-December 2013 | Page 34

at every level, creating a “kind of friction that is
inconceivable unless one has experienced war.”4
Success, he concluded, goes to commanders who
outmatch the enemy’s ability to exploit friction.
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who considered
himself a disciple of Clausewitz, is known as
“The Father of Auftragstaktik.”5 During Moltke’s
30-year tenure as chief of staff, auftragstaktik was
“established as coherent theory . . . and enforced
as official doctrine.”6 Moltke cemented the support that military culture, education, and training
gave to what had become decentralized command.
Schools gave extensive tactical educations even
to junior officers and noncommissioned officers.7
Leaders typically valued aggressive initiative
over strict obedience from their subordinates, and,
until the 1920s, officers faced training scenarios
in which they had to disobey orders to meet the
commander’s intent.8
Decentralized command propelled the Prussians to rapid victory over the French in 1870. In
1918, semiautonomous German “shock troops”
achieved the only major tactical breakthrough on
the Western Front (a breakthrough they could not
exploit due to attrition and logistical shortcomings).9 Later, as a key components of “blitzkrieg,”
auftragstaktik fueled the quick defeat of Allied
armies in Europe, Asia, and Africa at the start of
World War II.
Elements of this philosophy drifted across the
Atlantic. Since at least 1905, U.S. Army doctrine
has sporadically endorsed these elements.10 As
long ago as the American Civil War, a few notable
commanders (such as Ulysses S. Grant and Robert
E. Lee) routinely issued mission orders.11 General
George S. Patton Jr. exemplified mission command
more than any other American commander, even
outperforming his German foes in this regard.
“Never tell people how to do things,” wrote Patton.
“Tell them what to do, and they will surprise you
with their ingenuity.”12
Nonetheless, it was not until our Army looked
for ways to offset the Soviet army’s huge quantitative edge in Europe that auftragstaktik was
given precedence in doctrine.13 The 1982 U.S.
Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, was
a milestone in this regard, emphasizing mission
orders, subordinate initiative, and an “offensive
spirit” (an unintended double entendre).14
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Today, mission command is the foundation of the
U.S. Army’s warfighting philosophy.15 It features
prominently in key doctrine and as a subject at
service schools.16 It even has a dedicated manual,
Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission Command,
which defines mission command as the “exercise of
authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the
commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive
leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”17
Thanks to our Army’s adopting auftragstaktik,
advocates say we can do more with less throughout
the spectrum of conflict. Mission command gives
small unit commanders the flexibility to rapidly react,
maneuver, and win battles involving heavy conventional forces. Since “local commanders have the best
grasp of their situations,” empowering junior officers
to solve their own problems helps us defeat insurgencies.18 And, decentralizing information operations
ensures we keep pace with dispersed enemies’ rapid
delivery of messages to key populations.19 Doctrine
and training, proponents argue, have finally come
together to ensure that Army leaders can outmatch
their enemies’ ability to exploit friction.
If only it were this easy.

Helmuth von Moltke the Elder is often referred to as “the Father
of Auftragstaktik.” It was under his direction that the Prussian
Army institutionalized the mission command philosophy.

November-December 2013

• MILITARY REVIEW