Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 78

would make ILE a true combined arms school for all, not just for those at Leavenworth. Additionally, spreading talent across the different types of ILE would introduce diversity in the students attending AMSPs. Graduates of those second-year programs have included officers from Leavenworth, graduates of other service and allied CSCs, and officers who completed ILE entirely by distance education. The distribution of AMSP graduates, at first only to divisions and corps, expanded commensurate with expansion of SAMS in the early 2000s. Present-day distribution of AMSP graduates includes almost forty additional requisitions, most of which are individual augmentee positions for joint task forces and theater-level commands. The sustained demand for AMSP graduates, combined with the fact that not all Leavenworth ILE students apply to AMSPs, suggests that AMSPs would continue to draw applicants from all types of ILE.22 Instituting a baseline quality cut through an entrance examination and then identifying the greatest talent in the candidate pool through a selection board would pay long-term dividends. Increasing rigor in this manner would distinguish superior officers from the merely competent, while serving notice on officers unprepared to serve above the tactical level. Disenrolling underperforming students from ILE quickly without prejudice would provide a catalyst for students who required remediation to seek it, while debriding from the ranks those who could not meet standards. The longterm return on investment to the Army, in the form of greater intellectual capacity being returned to the force from a more rigorous CGSC, would far outweigh whatever opportunity costs might be incurred in the short term. Implementation would instill a standard of intellectual capability that would benefit the entire force and educate officers to build upon but not be prisoners of their immediate experiences. The true benefit would come over time as graduates of this revamped ILE applied the rigors of their education to lead their units through the challenges of an uncertain future. Biography Col. Francis Park, U.S. Army, is a strategist assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Operation Enduring Freedom Study Group, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the nonresident Command and General Staff Officer Course, the U.S. Army War College Basic Strategic Art Program, and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Kansas. His previous assignments include strategic plans and policy assignments at the division and joint task force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan and at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command; intermediate-level education instructor at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; strategy branch chief, Strategic Plans, Concepts, and Doctrine Division, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-3/5; and deputy director, Commander’s Action Group, International Security Assistance Force. Notes 1. Lt. Gen. Robert B. Brown, “The Army University: Educating Leaders to Win in a Complex World” Military Review 95(4) ( July– August 2015): 19. 2. Ibid., 22. 3. Ibid., 19–22. 4. Hanson W. Baldwin, “Army College Expands: Leavenworth Broadens Scope, Has 496 U.S. Officers and 52 From Abroad,” New York Times, 17 January 1949, 8, as cited in Michael D. Stewart, “Raising A Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College [CGSC], 1946–1986,” (doctoral dissertation, University of Kansas, 2010), 30; Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 18 December 2009), 71. 76 5. Officer Personnel Management System [OPMS] XXI Task Force, Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army [HQDA], 1997), 4-12; OPMS XXI Task Force, “OPMS XXI Precursor Study Issue Paper: Nonselection for Resident CGSC and Its Career Implications,” (issue paper, HQDA, Washington, DC, 9 April 1996). 6. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003), OS-12–OS-13, ADA415810, Defense Technical Information Center. 7. The need to refocus on previously neglected tasks was one of the Army’s t raining challenges, as described in John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2015, presented to the 114th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, May-June 2016  MILITARY REVIEW