Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 17

RUSSIAN WARFARE

common enemy.37 Conveniently, these disparate militant
groups are more deniable than regular Russian forces.
Encirclement and annihilation tactics were decisive
in Russia’s war with Ukraine. In the battle for Ilovaisk,
Ukrainian forces seized a critical road-and-rail junction between the separatists-held cities of Donetsk and
Luhansk. Russian forces quickly surrounded and besieged the city. Casualties and demoralization weakened
the Ukrainian forces, leading to an agreed withdrawal
for safe passage. According to Newsweek, Putin himself
sanctioned the agreement, but Russian forces ambushed and destroyed the retreating Ukrainian column.
Officially, Kiev admits to 108 killed, but eyewitnesses
report five-to-six times that number.38 Russia used the
same tactics in Debaltseve in January 2015. In this battle,
Ukrainian armed forces once again occupied a critical
road-and-rail junction between both separatist regions.
Russian and separatist forces advanced against the flanks
of the city, creating a salient. Fearing complete encirclement, Ukrainian forces retreated. Once again, Russian
forces waited in ambush. One survivor recounted, “Yes,
the Russians let us retreat and we were met with tanks
and grads [mobile rocket launchers].”39 The Ukrainian
government announced that 179 Ukrainian soldiers
were killed, 110 were captured, and 81 were missing.40
Both battles left the Ukrainian forces demoralized.
Internal division settled in with forces who blamed Kiev
for abandoning them.

Conclusion and Recommendations
Berzins’s paper on Russian NGW provides an
excellent framework to gain an understanding of what
Russia was doing in April 2014. The benefit of hindsight is that it allows one to see that Russian actions
in the Ukraine have a historical context strategically,
operationally, and tactically with minor adaptations.
There are a number of things the United States and
NATO can do to counter Russian aggression; why

not use what worked in the past against Russia with
minor adaptations?
Strategically, Operation Atlantic Resolve, the
U.S.-led operation in Europe to provide assurance to
NATO allies, is very similar to the policy of containment outlined in NSC-68 (a National Security
Council report) by the Truman administration.41 The
major advantage for NATO is the former Warsaw
Pact enemies it now calls allies. Figure 2 depicts the
spread of NATO after the demise of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics in 1989. Partnership with
these nations serves to assure NATO allies that they
will not be abandoned in the face of Russian territorial expansion.
Operationally, NATO must counter the Russian
deep operations that seek to delegitimize the sovereignty of vulnerable NATO members, and it must
take measures to bolster its collective willpower.
Additionally, failure to counter Russian information
warfare could fracture the trans-Atlantic security
framework that serves to protect the freedom, prosperity, and peace for millions.
Tactically, NATO should embrace the hybrid model. NATO operated as a hybrid force in Afghanistan
and, given the small armies of NATO allies, the likelihood is high of partnering with militias in the event of
future conflict.
Russia appears to have chosen recidivism over
peaceful coexistence. Russia is setting the terms and
defining the operational environment because of its
relatively unchallenged aggressive audacity, but the
Russian way of warfare and its historic propensity
for expanding in the face of weak resistance has been
generally consistent throughout its entire history.
Consequently, the real problem facing NATO is not a
new brand of Russian warfare or new policy of expansion, but its own reluctance to return to its original
purpose of preventing Russian conquest.

Biography

Maj. Nicholas Sinclair, U.S. Army, is the battalion executive officer for 1-68AR, 3ABCT, 4th Infantry
Division. He holds a BA from The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, and is a graduate of the School of
Advanced Military Studies on Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

MILITARY REVIEW  May-June 2016

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