Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 15

RUSSIAN WARFARE

the Ukrainian army capitulated after a wellplanned and -executed information campaign.24
Russia perfected its use of information warfare
through the use of reflexive control. In Recasting the
Red Star, Timothy Thomas defines reflexive control
as “a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him
to voluntarily make the predetermined decision
desired by the initiator of the action.”25 Russian
reflexive control appeared successful targeting
Ukraine’s NATO partners as well. NATO members were reluctant to get involved in the conflict,
effectively isolating the Ukraine from the international community.26
Russia uses reflexive control to put its neighbors
on the horns of a dilemma. Either the countries
allow Russian citizens within their borders and
deal with eventual separatist movements, or those
countries isolate their Russian populations and give
Russia pretense for invasion. In his book A Little
War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the
Future of the West, Ronald Asmus outlines how
this occurred in Georgia in 2008.27 Asmus accuses Russia of enabling separatist South Ossetians
to attack Georgian towns from within Russiancontrolled areas. After steady escalation, Georgia
responded with a military attack of its own, killing
fifty Russian peacekeepers in the process. The
Russian response was severe, crushing the Georgian
army and acquiring two new vassal states (South
(Graphic courtesy of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)
Ossetia and Abkhazia) at the expense of Georgian
Lenin’s ultimate deep fight, the indirect approach
sovereignty. According to Asmus, however, the
targeting Western morale. He stated that “the soundest Russian counterattack force crossed into South Ossetia
strategy in any campaign is to postpone battle and the
from Russia days before the Georgian attack even started.
soundest tactics to postpone attack, until the moral
Russian information warfare spun a narrative of an agdislocation of the enemy renders the delivery of the
gressive Georgian military that attacked Russian troops,
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decisive blow practical.”
leaving Russia no choice but to counterattack. This classic
example of reflexive control allowed Russia to gain territoOperational Adaptations
rially at the expense of Georgia. Russia won the informaRussia continues to use deep operations to achieve
tion war as well. European news outlets and international
expansion of its borders, but it has also made grea t
bodies assigned Georgia the blame for the war.28
improvements targeting the psyche of adversaries and
neutrals. Russian deep operations enabled its territoTactical Means
rial ambitions by tearing off pieces of Georgia and the
Berzins outlines two developments in Russia’s tactical
Ukraine with an excuse that it was protecting its native means. First is the use of a hybrid force; the “use of armed
Russian populations abroad and promoting national
civilians (four civilian to one military).”29 The U.S. Army’s
self-determination. When Russia seized the Crimea,
Training Circular 7-100, The Hybrid Threat, defines the
MILITARY REVIEW  May-June 2016

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