Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 131

BOOK REVIEWS
THE LAST WARRIOR: Andrew
Marshall and the Shaping of Modern
American Defense Strategy
Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, Basic
Books, New York, 2015, 336 pages

I

n the arena of national security policy, Andrew
Marshall may be the “most influential man you
have never heard of.” Through most of the Cold
War and up to his retirement in 2015, Marshall operated behind the scenes, first at the RAND Corporation
and then in the little-known Office of Net Assessment
(ONA), an organization buried deep in the recesses of
the Pentagon. There, he advised a series of key leaders on
how to manage the strategic competition with the Soviet
Union and, more recently, China. Sometimes jokingly
referred to as “Yoda,” he mentored platoons of bright
young officers and defense intellectuals in an office that
eventually became known as “Saint Andrew’s Prep.”
In The Last Warrior, authors Andrew Krepinevich
and Barry Watts trace Marshall’s career in what they
call an “intellectual history” rather than a standard
biography. Their book describes Marshall’s education
as a young economist recruited to the newly created
RAND Corporation in 1949. There, Marshall analyzed the problems of nuclear strategy with such wellknown “wizards of Armageddon” as Bernard Brodie,
Albert Wohlstetter, and Herman Kahn. With the
maturation of his analytical skills, Henry Kissinger
lured Marshall from California to Washington; by
1973, he became the head of the new ONA under
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. In this role,
Marshall’s mission was to look over the horizon to
anticipate emerging threats while seeking areas of
opportunity where the United States might gain an
advantage over its rivals. There, he identified the early
signs of the Soviet Union’s collapse; he heralded the
“Revolution in Military Affairs,” and he offered the
MILITARY REVIEW  May-June 2016

first warnings of China’s rise as a strategic competitor
to the United States.
Given this track record, the authors argue that
Marshall is one of the great unsung heroes of recent
American history. Yet, they face at least four formidable obstacles in making their case. First, Marshall is
reticent about putting himself in the spotlight. He is, by
nature, a self-effacing man, and he let his protégés write
the ONA’s most influential studies and assessments.
Second, much of the important work Marshall was
involved with remains classified. Third, Marshall insisted that ONA’s products be “diagnostic” rather than
prescriptive. He directed his subordinates to identify
issues and opportunities without recommending a certain course of action. Thus, one is hard-pressed to assess
his role in the constructing of key policies. Fourth,
there is the issue of bias. Both Watts and Krepinevich
are former members of “Saint Andrew’s Prep,” and
Krepinevich leads the Centre for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments—a think tank that receives a
sizeable chunk of its budget from ONA.
For these reasons, readers may have to make their
own assessments of Marshall’s significance. Granting
that, the book is well-written, well-researched, and recommended for those looking for “deep background” on
U.S. strategic decision making in the Cold War and after.

Scott Stephenson,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HOSTILE INTENT AND COUNTERTERRORISM: Human Factors Theory
and Application
Edited by Alex Stedmon and Glyn Lawson,
Ashgate, Burlington, Vermont, 2015, 356 pages

T

errorism is becoming more diverse and
innovative as it continues to evolve. Defense,
intelligence, and police services are tasked
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