Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 127

ASSIGNING FORCES

A Balance of Interests
Goldwater-Nichols was largely about balance: balancing service and CCMD interests and influence and
balancing combatant commanders’ authorities with their
responsibilities.17 Assigning the force was one aspect of this
balance that has not yet been realized. Assignment does

not take away any service title 10 authorities. Even with all
forces assigned, services have all the authority they need
to perform their ADCON responsibilities. Assigning the
force to CCMDs would benefit the services and CCMDs
and ultimately better synchronize DOD planning and
resourcing to support national security objectives.

Biography
Lt. Col. Heather Reed, U.S. Army, is the force structure branch chief in the U.S. Forces Korea J-8 (Force Structure,
Resource, and Assessment Directorate). She holds a BS from the United States Military Academy and an MS from
Long Island University. She has served in the 4th Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division as well as separate brigades in Korea; Headquarters, Department of the Army; and the Joint Staff. Her operational assignments
included deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan where she worked global force management.

Notes
1. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986).
2. Department of Defense (DOD), Global Force Management
Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) (Washington, DC: DOD, 25
February 2014), III-10 (document is classified; all information used in
this article is unclassified and cleared for public release).
3. Ibid., III-5. A combatant command (CCMD) sends a “request
for forces” to the secretary of defense to obtain units for a mission.
4. Ibid., A-2-21. This article focuses on operating forces and
therefore does not discuss generating forces.
5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM)
3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System ( JOPES)
Volume 1, Planning Policies and Procedures (Washington, DC: DOD,
29 September 2006), GL-13 (limited distribution; login required);
10 U.S.C. § 164, 1986.
6. Field Manual (FM) 3-94, Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO],
21 April 2014), para. 1-38–1-56.
7. The Unified Command Plan (UCP), prepared by the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff every two years, assigns missions; planning, training, and operational responsibilities; and geographic areas
of responsibilities to CCMDs. The Forces for Unified Commands
prescribes which forces are assigned to each CCMD in line with their
UCP assigned missions. They align with 10 U.S.C. § 161.
8. Secretary of Defense, memorandum to secretaries of the
Military Departments, et. al., United States Joint Forces Command
Disestablishment, 9 February 2011.
9. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: U .S. GPO, 25 March 2013), V-12.
10. Ibid., II-2.
11. Ibid., II-4. Per JP 1, Guidance for Employment of the Force
(GEF) merges comprehensive, near-term contingency planning and
security cooperation guidance. The president approves the contingency planning guidance and approves the secretary of defense’s
issuance of the GEF. Guided by the UCP and National Defense

MILITARY REVIEW  May-June 2016

Strategy, the GEF forms the basis for strategic policy guidance, campaign plans, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
12. FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 22 January 2013), Glossary-3, defines regionally
aligned forces: “Those forces that provide a combatant commander
with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the
environment. They are those Army units assigned to CCMDs, those
Army units allocated to a combatant command, and those Army
capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant
command regional missions.” Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Expeditionary Force 21 Capstone Concept (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO,
4 March 2014), 11–18, discusses regionally oriented Marine forces.
13. CJCSM 3130.01A, Campaign Planning Procedures and
Responsibilities (Washington, DC: DOD, 25 November 2014),
C-6. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) is
the cyclic process for determining requirements and allocating
DOD resources. The Joint Strategic Planning System is the primary
means by which the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides
strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans;
prepares and reviews contingency plans; and advises the president
and secretary of defense. The Future Years Defense Program is the
official document and database summarizing forces and resources
associated with DOD programs.
14. Under 10 U.S.C. § 155, the Joint Staff is prohibited from
acting in the capacity of a general staff.
15. Single-service organizations that could exercise OPCON
of their assigned forces were specified commands; the last were
U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air
Command.
16. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System Volume 1, E-7.
17. James R. Locher III, “Has it Worked, The Goldwater-Nichols
Reorganization Act,” Naval War College Review 54(4) (Autumn
2001): 9–10.

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