Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 9
OFFENSIVE CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
Joint Targeting Cycle
opponent could use the data to design and build a
cyber weapon to attack U.S. or allied interests.
In addition to the challenges of secrecy, the technical aspects of cyberspace operations are difficult
to grasp for those without technical training. This
is especially so in comparison to traditional weapon
systems. Cyberspace is not like the traditional physical domains where we can touch and see all the parts.
Rather, cyberspace is primarily a virtual realm that
can be manipulated to achieve real-world effects in
the air, land, maritime, and space domains. Putting a
bomb on target is easier to visualize than launching a
multihost cyber attack that will penetrate a network
and eventually weaken or destroy a critical system.13
Marginalization by inaccessibility. Whether the
issue is difficulty in understanding, getting access
to, or employing technically complex cyberspace
capabilities—inaccessibility can marginalize OCO
more than any opponent’s defenses. Unfortunately,
inaccessibility can make operational planners apathetic about employing OCO. They may regard
“cyberspace operations” as a buzzword the boss
MILITARY REVIEW
May-June 2014
wants to pay lip service to rather than a set of weapons and tactics that deliver tangible benefits. At best,
OCO can become marginalized—employed on the
fringes of operations as they are not understood,
not accessible, not easy to employ, and not trusted .
The joint targeting cycle. In addition to the
common misconceptions and inaccessibility issues
surrounding OCO, certain challenges are inherent to fitting OCO into the joint targeting cycle
(see figure).14 Two phases of the joint targeting
cycle—target development and prioritization, and
capabilities analysis—have the most significant
upstream effect on planning the operational employment of OCO.
United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)
coordinates the desired cyberspace effects against
a target, based on the priorities of the combatant
commander or JTF commander. During contingency
planning, the capabilities analysis phase seeks to
match apportioned assets and ordnance with the
target and effect desired. Once a target is selected to
be serviced by traditional means, it is periodically
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