Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 26

the processes in our energy, transportation, water
management, and other industries. They are the
backbone in the technical structure of our society.
SCADA systems can remain viable for decades,
depending on the processes and machinery these
systems control. However, SCADA systems often
lack capacity or are difficult to upgrade to meet
contemporary cybersecurity challenges. Many of
these systems were never intended nor designed to
be connected to any other computer, let alone linked
to a global information network such as the Internet.
The range of vulnerabilities has increased dramatically as embedded software in electro-mechanical
machinery has become a standard feature. These
programmable controllers in industry and utility
companies have limited cybersecurity features.
The hardening and increased protection of American SCADA systems is likely to take decades; the
majority of the SCADA systems are not upgraded
once installed and need additional computer hard-

The Big Tujunga Dam is under construction to reinforce the walls
due to an increased debris flow from recent severe winter storms,
La Cañada Flintridge, Calif., 2 August 2010. (Adam DuBrowa, FEMA)
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ware to be secured. The defense of these systems
is defense in depth, where the corporations and
municipalities are parties, as well as the Department
of Defense in conjunction with other federal agencies. The most able components in these defensive
layers reside within the federal sphere. The question is—if cyberdefense fails, what could happen?
The environmental ramifications deserve as much
attention as the potential threat to computer systems.

Hydroelectric Dams and
Reservoirs

For example, a series of dam failures in a large
watershed would have significant environmental
impacts. Hydroelectric dams and reservoirs are
controlled using different forms of computer networks, either cable or wireless, and the control
networks connect to the Internet. A breach in the
cyberdefenses of an electric utility company could
lead all the way down to the logic controllers that
instruct the electric machinery to open the floodgates. Many hydroelectric dams and reservoirs are
designed as a chain of dams in a major watershed
to create an even flow of water for generating
energy. A cyberattack on several upstream dams
could release water that would increase pressure
on downstream dams. With rapidly diminishing
storage capacity, downstream dams would risk
being breached by the oncoming water. Eventually, the attack could have a cascading effect,
literally and figuratively, through the river system
and result in a catastrophic flood. The traditional
cybersecurity way to frame the problem is to
consider the loss of function and disruption in
electricity generation—overlooking the potential
environmental effect of an inland tsunami. This is
especially troublesome where the population and
the industries are dense along a river, such as in
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and other areas with
cities built around historic mills. If the cyberattack occurred during a heavy rain when the dams
were already stressed, any rapid increase in water
level could trigger successive dam collapses. 8
This could lead to a catastrophic loss of lives and
property and a critical loss of hydroelectric capacity. The environmental effects would be dramatic
and long-term: freshwater resources would be
contaminated, complete ecosystems destroyed,
toxic agents released, and soil heavily eroded or
May-June 2014 MILITARY REVIEW