Military Review English Edition March-April 2016 | Page 65

CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

Army strategy to counter
those threats, suggests
that the regionally aligned
forces require a capability to synchronize DOD
and DOS activities. This
capability does not currently exist programmatically;
commanders must either
possess the ability to synchronize objectives, or they
require an organization
with this capability working
for them.
Based on the nature of
security cooperation, these
(Photo by Pfc. Roy Mercon, 172nd Cavalry Regiment PAO)
regionally aligned mission
Capt. Terrance McIntosh, a civil affairs officer from Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron,
sets are likely to take place
172nd Cavalry Regiment, distributes supplies during a humanitarian aid mission 25 August 2010 in the
in Phase 0 (Shape) environ- village of Bashikal in Parwan Province, Pakistan. The village was affected by damaging floods, and the aid
included bags of rice and cooking oil.
ments.14 This environment
is commonly referred to as a Title 22 zone, which signifies
insurgent abilities to spread that ideology, while synthat the DOS and the U.S. ambassador assumes the lead
chronizing DOS and SOF activities, and emphasizing
for promoting U.S. interests, and the DOD is the supengagements and relationship building.
porting organization.15 As the U.S. Army seeks to become
USSOCOM Directive 525-38 formalized the
regionally engaged, in order to deter threats derived from
CME program in 2014 (which had been in execution
undergoverned areas, it appears critical that DOD objecfor several years) and provided program direction.
tives remain nested within the DOS strategic plans.
CMSE’s are scalable, modular, and they deploy at the
request of a combatant commander, a chief of misOptimal Solution
sion, or a TSOC in support of theater campaign plans.
In 2013, then commander of U.S. Special Operations
Unlike the Army-funded Major Force Program 2
Command (USSOCOM ), Adm. William McRaven,
(MFP-2), which supports conventional forces, CME
presented Congress with a SOF capability that focused
is a baseline MFP-11 program that supports SOF
on preventing the emergence of conflict by projectforces. However, if adopted by FORSCOM and funding governance into undergoverned areas. He stated,
ed through MFP-2, the core activities of CME could
“through civil-military support elements (CMSE) and
enhance the FORSCOM mission.17
support to public diplomacy, SOF directly supports
The core activities of CME are population-centric
interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology
within a specific country, region, or area of interest.
and diminish the drivers of violence that al-Qaida and
Core CME activities include:
other terrorists exploit.”16 McRaven went on to describe
1. Gain and maintain access to areas of interest.
CMSE efforts that help prevent terrorist radicalization,
2. Establish enduring relationships and networks
recruitment, and mobilization. The CMSE is the elewith populations and key stakeholders.
ment of the CME program of record, executed by civil
3. Address critical civil vulnerabilities, which could
affairs (CA) soldiers. These elements provide commandbe exploited by destabilizing factors or groups.
ers with a valuable way of accomplishing DOD objec4. Plan, coordinate, facilitate, and execute SOF spetives in a Title 22 environment. CMSE efforts are percific programs, operations, and activities, synchronizing
sistent and differ from traditional military campaigns by
short-to-midterm objectives with mid- to long-term
proactively identifying insurgent ideology and mitigating U.S. government (USG) objectives.
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