Military Review English Edition March-April 2016 | Page 63

CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

Insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, nation states, and their proxies exploit gaps in policy developed
for the more predictable world of yesterday. The direct approach alone ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect
approach and broader governmental elements to take effect. Less well known but decisive in importance, the indirect approach is the element that can counter the systemic components of the threat.
—Adm. William H. McRaven, Posture Statement to Congress 2013
Ineffective governance create areas that terrorists and insurgents can exploit. CA [civil affairs] forces address these threats
by serving as the vanguard of DOD’s support to U.S. government efforts to assist partner governments.
—Quadrennial Defense Review Report

I

nsurgent organizations, similar to the Islamic State
(IS), arguably present the United States with its
most serious challenge today. The aggressive tactics
and ambitious objectives of IS threaten both U.S. foreign
policy and global security. After more than ten years of
involvement in Iraq by the United States and its allies,
how did this threat grow so rapidly? Perhaps oversimplified, but accurate nonetheless, IS grew as a result of
ineffective, negligent, and sectarian governance in Syria
and Iraq.1 Generally speaking, a government’s inability
to demonstrate legitimate governance enables the development of nonstate terrorist and criminal organizations.
The challenge to U.S. security is magnified because these
organizations are able to project power transnationally
and lack political accountability.2
Those organizations exploit vulnerabilities that
local governments are unable to mitigate. As the
vulnerabilities persist, the population begins to shift
its support toward organizations capable of addressing their needs, thus weakening the legitimacy of the
government. Ineffective governance is not always
synonymous with a lack of security forces; rather,
it may result from an increase in governance infrastructure that is not state sponsored. For example,
the government in Sri Lanka has a robust presence
throughout its territory, but it lacks historical legitimacy in much of the country because of sectarian
differences. As a result, the nonstate Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam developed an informal infrastructure that was arguably more legitimate in the
eyes of much of the populace and competed with
the established government.3 That phenomenon is
demonstrated globally and is one of the key contributors in the creation of undergoverned territories.
Those threats are so significant to U.S. security, the
MILITARY REVIEW  March-April 2016

U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC) lists transnational terrorist and criminal organizations as key
harbingers of future conflict.4
The AOC calls for regionally engaged Army forces
to establish a global landpower network, shape security environments, and proactively prevent conflict.5
Given this view of the future operating environment,
this article introduces the U.S. Special Operations
Command Civil-Military Engagement (CME)
Program and recommends that the U.S. Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) adopt the CME program
to increase both the effectiveness of the regionally
aligned forces and address the threats found in undergoverned areas. The CME program can use humanitarian assistance to gain access into ungoverned areas,
while potentially providing presence and situational
awareness. It can also enhance the unity of effort
among Department of State (DOS) and Department
of Defense (DOD) activities in support of unified land
operations. However, the greatest value of the CME
program is its ability to spearhead local governance
into targeted, undergoverned regions of interest to the
commander, addressing the governance conditions
that allow threats to thrive.
This article will first review studies and strategic
guidance describing military operations in undergoverned areas. Then it will provide an overview of
the CME program and its objectives. Finally, this
article presents historical examples of CME missions
in Pakistan and Sri Lanka that will demonstrate the
value provided to special operations forces (SOF)
commanders. Those examples, combined with strategic guidance, demonstrate that the CME program has
been critical in the accomplishment of Theater Special
Operations Command (TSOC) objectives and should
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