Military Review English Edition March-April 2016 | Page 43

COMPLEX WORLD

Notes
1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Winning in
a Complex World 2020-2040 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 31 October
2014), iii, accessed 2 October 2015, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/
tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 19 and 31.
4. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office [GPO], November 2014), 1-1,
accessed 2 October 2015, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/
DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp2_01x3.pdf.
5. Horst W. J. Rittel, “On the Planning Crisis: Systems Analysis
of the ‘First and Second Generations,’” Bedriftsøkonomen 8 (1972),
392–393; TP 525-5-500, The United States Army Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 28 January
2008). Originally coined by Rittel, the term “wicked problems” is used
here as defined in TP 525-5-500 as problems that are ill-structured,
complex, nonlinear, and chaotic.
6. Karl R. Popper, Of Clouds and Clocks: An Approach to the Problem of Rationality and the Freedom of Man, 1972, The Rathouse website, accessed 2 October 2015, http://www.the-rathouse.com/2011/
Clouds-and-Clocks.html.
7. Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, trans. and ed.
Hans W. Gatzke (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003),
19; Dietrich Dörmer, The Logic of Failure, Recognizing and
Avoiding Error in Complex Situations (Cambridge, MA: Perseus
Books, 1996), 170; U.S. Army School of Advanced Military
Studies, The Art of Design, Student Text, version 2.0. 2011, 48,

MILITARY REVIEW  March-April 2016

accessed 2 October 2015, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/
events/sams/ArtofDesign_v2.pdf.
8. Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can
Make a Big Difference (New York: Back Bay Books, 2002), 160.
9. Grant Martin, “Deniers of ‘the Truth’: Why an Agnostic
Approach to Warfare is Key,” Military Review ( January–February 2015): 42, accessed 2 October 2015, http://www.joomag.
com/magazine/military-review-english-edition-january-february-2015/0458792001419375392.
10. ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation, 1-1.
11. Brigham J. Mann, Systemic Thinking: Enhancing Intelligence
Preparation and Estimates, Naval War College paper, 30 April 2010,
accessed 2 October 2015, http://dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a525138.pdf.
12. Scott Stanford, “Enemies Wanted: No Experience Necessary The Army’s Addiction to Enemies Inhibits Analysis of the Operational
Environment,” Small Wars Journal, 1 April 2015, accessed 2 October
2015, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ enemies-wanted-no-experience-necessary-the-army%E2%80%99s-addiction-to-enemies-inhibits-analysis-of.
13. Martin, “Deniers,” 44.
14. Ibid., 50.
15. Ibid.
16. Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice: Includes a
30-Year Retrospective (New York: Wiley, 1999), A16. “Rich Picture” is a
soft systems methodology concept for developing deep understanding of ill-structured/complex problems by going through the process
of drawing extremely detailed pictures, which enhances understanding of the environment and problem.
17. Mann, Systemic Thinking, 13.

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