Military Review English Edition March-April 2016 | Page 42

experience, rarely revisited after steps one and two of
IPB. The constant reframing of Army design methodology (systemic operational design) with focus on the
environmental system(s) would better serve commanders in the COE.
Design allows commanders to take an unstructured approach or “agnostic” approach to generating understanding.13 As Martin states, an agnostic
approach is more inclusive and “appreciates multiple
view points and paradigms.”14 He goes on to observe,
“Creatively thinking about warfare ought to be encouraged, and we must resist institutional attempts
to codify how to approach thinking.”15 Therefore, to
be truly successful in the COE, Army leaders have to
challenge fundamental beliefs, take a critical approach
to warfare, and unwed themselves from any one approach or checklist. More than ever before, the Army
needs unbridled critical and creative thinkers; this is
especially true for intelligence professionals.
With that said, the Army cannot completely divorce
itself from models; it must have something to help
guide it, and systemic operational design and systems
theories offer a better way to analyze and understand
unstructured problems than IPB. On the operational
side of the house, the use of systemic concepts is not
new—Army design methodology is well codified in
doctrine. However, on the intelligence side, the embrace of systems thinking and incorporation of it into
doctrine and into tactics, techniques, and procedures
has been slow going, even though understanding the
complex adaptive systems that comprise the environment is the lynchpin to success in the COE.
In the COE, commanders do not have the luxury of
clarity, certainty, or templates. In most cases, the commander’s set of circumstances will be wholly unique and
unlike anything experienced in the past. The value of
having a profound and penetrating understanding and
awareness, or what soft systems theorists would call a “rich
picture” understanding, cannot be overstated because
it helps the commander understand “why” things are
happening and drives center of gravity analysis, collection
planning, targeting, and the overall operational design.16

Thus, the systemic approach focuses on the environment
and problem as opposed to IPB’s focus on the enemy.
Systemic thinking characterizes the environment
and identifies root causes to such problems, not just the
symptoms. Lt. Col. Brigham Mann puts it this way: “In
essence, systemic thinkers attempt to ensure the military
is ‘doing the right things,’ which is arguably much more
important than just ‘doing things right.’”17
IPB is first in class for structured, enemy-centric
problems, but systems theory-based approaches will
better satisfy the commander’s information requirements in complex environments. Experiences over the
last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan show the potential
consequences of failing to understand the environment, a failure partly due to the limitations of IPB. Not
to be misunderstood, this article does not advocate the
death of IPB, but draws attention to the limitations and
drawbacks concomitant with IPB, and advises using it
only where appropriate (i.e., structured, enemy-centric
operating environments).

Conclusion
The consequences of failure in the COE are high. So it
is incumbent on intelligence professionals and commanders to take every step and precaution necessary to avoid
psychological traps that would lead to the use of ill-suited
analytical models and framing tools.
Therefore, for operating in the complex world, the
Army should update intelligence doctrine to include
systems theory analysis and intelligence operations. By
understanding the character, function, and behavior of
the complex adaptive systems of an operational environment, an intelligence staff officer will be better able to
characterize the environment and help the commander
frame the problem, thus making sense of the chaos.
We can never fully understand the full complexity of the “cloud” in the same way we understand the
“clock,” but we can develop a better appreciation for it
as well as greater understanding on how to deal with it
by incorporating systemic approaches. To this end, IPB
and systems theory approaches complement each other
and together are a great one-two punch.

Maj. Donald Carter, U.S. Army, holds BA and MA degrees in political science. He is a military intelligence officer
and has served in a variety of assignments from tactical to strategic.
40

March-April 2016  MILITARY REVIEW