Military Review English Edition March-April 2016 | Page 124

both played key roles in the Vietnam War. Of course,
the author puts most of his effort into explaining
why specialized training and education in the subject
are so important, and his examples are compelling in
justifying his point of view. Certainly leaders of both
types of forces would benefit from a close read of
Donovan’s Counterinsurgency.
There will be those who will say that this book
certainly seems to fit the mold of a classic work
on counterinsurgency theory and practice, such as
Roger Trinquier’s and David Galula’s famous treatises, as it too is founded on the experience of a lost
counterinsurgency war.5 Why should we think we
can gain something useful from the losing side? As
Sun Tzu tells us, “Those unable to understand the
dangers inherent in employing troops are equally
unable to understand the advantageous ways of
doing so.” Perhaps nothing is so instructive than
learning lessons from one’s failure to overcome those

dangers, from losing battles, even from losing wars.
Therein lies the irony encapsulated in the title of
Donovan’s book. We came, we saw, we learned, we
lost, and then we forgot; it shouldn’t be this way.
This is a work that deserves a place on professional
military and U.S. foreign policy reading lists. First, it
reinforces a respect for historical experience that can
inform future readiness. Counter