Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 98

Methodological Concerns Epistemological Concerns Population-centric approach versus territory- or fixed-objective-centric Police-oriented approach, versus military-oriented, versus information-oriented How an army understands time, relationships, and how to influence them How an army views ways to gain support of the population over time How victory is framed—as the destruction of something tangible, or as the intangible actions of the population at risk (Do we understand a difference?) How to measure success—as tied to metrics and tangible items or actions, or as associated with conceptual processes How governance supports counterinsurgency, the form of government best suited for this environment, and the forms not suitable Winning hearts and minds approach versus endsjustifies-the-means Attacking a network, a system-of-systems nodal approach Securing territory in a clear, hold, and build approach to capitalize on population stability National government and centralized authority tied to rule of law, enforced by security forces for entire population Train, advise, and assist security forces to operate and eventually replace all occupying forces How to teach security forces, in what manner, and what tasks and functions to teach Table. Methodological Versus Epistemological Concerns for Counterinsurgency The U.S. Army’s generally accepted counterinsurgency methodology places primacy on securing the population while empowering a governmental form (democratic) we favor, supported by some sort of viable security element that moves the society toward stability and viability.4 To achieve this, we generally regard as essential having to establish, train, and support security forces so they can counter any insurgency within their nation, hence the name counterinsurgency.5 Methodological debates on counterinsurgency tend to address competing techniques, socioeconomic theories, and military strategy. An epistemological discussion goes further to address the abstract notion of counterinsurgency knowledge—and how U.S. forces exchange ideas with the host-nation forces that mold their empowered security element. This article examines the perspectives of teachers and students, and how the U.S. Army tends to understand the exchange of knowledge through one form of pedagogy. The Army’s epistemological perspective “acts as both a gatekeeper and bouncer for methodology in that it determines and regulates what is to be known and how it can be known.”6 The pedagogy of the Army—the 96 essence of teaching—forms the invisible foundation for any counterinsurgency concept or method. The Old Master Explication Model To address weaknesses in the Army’s pedagogical approach, this article draws inspiration from modern French philosopher Jacques Rancière’s The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation. This book is about the unusual teaching techniques of French schoolmaster Joseph Jacotot, who was employed by the king of the Netherlands in 1818. Jacotot, speaking no Flemish, was directed to teach French to a class of students who only spoke Flemish. Jacotot’s approach, based on what he called intellectual emancipation, challenged the entire Western model of classical education on epistemological, philosophical, and sociological levels. He taught topics he did not know, without learning Flemish, and he helped liberate his students to learn French by finding their own path. Rancière further developed Jacotot’s ideas. Why would a story about someone branded a mad schoolteacher by the mainstream educators of his time provide any value to a discussion about counterinsurgency?7 Although teaching the application of organized March-April 2015  MILITARY REVIEW