Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 148

various insights and approaches of the different authors provide a valuable resource and a fine addition
to any Civil War library.
John J. McGrath, Leavenworth, Kan.

DEFEATING JAPAN: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Strategy in the Pacific War, 1943–1945
Charles F. Brower, Palgrave MacMillan, New York,
2013, 234 pages

D

esigning wartime strategies and campaigns
is tough business. Civilian and uniformed
leaders operating at the nexus of strategic
decision making often collide over which considerations—political or military—should hold sway.
Should military leaders defer to policy makers or
integrate their decisions into their formulations of the
best possible expert military advice?
In an insightful new book, Charles Brower takes
on a widely held perspective that U.S. uniformed
leadership during World War II was often myopic in
prioritizing military considerations in their strategic advice to the national leadership, particularly in
the European theater of operations. Brower deftly
counters that in the Pacific theater, the U.S. Joint
Chiefs, including Army Chief of Staff George C.
Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J.
King, not only were influenced by political factors
but, at times, accorded them primacy.
Brower effectively demonstrates that policy
decisions exercised great influence over the conduct
of the Pacific War—in particular, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s demand for unconditional surrender,
his strong support for a substantive role for China
following the war, and insistence that the Pacific war
end as soon as possible but no more than one year
following the defeat of Germany’s Third Reich.
Brower makes a thorough examination of his
domain—the “upper case” designated wartime conferences, such as QUADRANT and OCTAGON, as
well as military operations, including lesser known
Pacific ventures such as ANAKIM, the retaking of
Burma from Japanese forces. Throughout his detailed analysis, the author clearly demonstrates that
political matters were always at the forefront of the
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Joint Chiefs’ thinking and served as the prism through
which all subsequent military operations were viewed.
To exemplify this point, let us take FDR’s overriding desire to give China and its leader, Chiang Kaishek, a key role in any post-war global configuration.
The Joint Chiefs, in response, subsequently prioritized
Chinese offensive operations in Burma, even when it
did not make the best military sense and in spite of
stiff opposition from their British counterparts on the
Combined Chiefs of Staff. From Brower’s viewpoint,
this example is clearly representative of the primacy
of policy in much of the Joint Chiefs’ deliberations
and subsequent military advice.
Brower’s attention to detail is reflected in his meticulous combing over of wartime diaries, conference
notes, and other primary references. He also includes
detailed notes and a comprehensive biography.
However, the book at times seems repetitive as similar
points are analyzed and emphasized from conference
to conference. The book’s high cost relative to its
length may be off-putting for some.
These nitpicks, however, do not detract from the
Brower’s strengths. The author more than effectively
shows the difficult give-and-take that national and
military leaders wrestled with on some of the weightiest issues of the Pacific and, by extension, World
War II. Brower thus makes his case, adding valuable
insight and a nuanced view of the impact policy has
on military strategy making.
Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Ga.

WARS OF PLUNDER: Conflicts, Profits and the
Politics of Resources
Philippe Le Bill