Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 132

marginalize German military advantages. As an aside, the
Allies had nine months to mobilize and prepare for the
war but wasted this precious time, which was characterized as the Sitzkrieg (the sitting war).
The Dyle Plan was not fundamentally flawed.7 The
Allied forward occupation of the line generally along
the Dyle River did shorten the front substantially.
Nevertheless, the failure to anchor the southern flank on
the Maginot Line, thereby leaving the Ardennes region
essentially undefended, was an unnecessary risk, which
presented the Germans with the opportunity to execute an operational envelopment. Nevertheless, even
without this blunder, the German army and Luftwaffe
so outclassed the Allies, a German decisive victory was
probably inevitable, though not quite so swift.
The basic idea behind the Maginot Line made
strategic sense in that it promised to provide immediate defense of France with a smaller army than was
hitherto possible. Its deterrent effect was not tied as
much to the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and
alliances as it was to a modern army maintaining a
high state of readiness.
Had the French army assiduously retained this
capability, the French government could have exercised
the option to intervene at any point before and including
the Sudetenland crisis. As part of its risk assessment, the
German government correctly assessed that the French
army was a hollow force and the Maginot Line a self-imposed prison.

The Air-Sea Battle Nostrum
Like the proponents of the Maginot Line, ASB advocates demonstrate a mentality that national security
can be assured with a silver bullet; they vow to protect
American vital interests most assuredly with joint
naval and air power. Currently, ASB is only a concept.
However, as political and economic pressures mount,
the temptation to elevate it into a strategy will increase
correspondingly. The result will be a much smaller
active Army with a ceiling well below the proposed
490,000 end strength. As a hedge, ASB advocates will
argue that in the case of a major conflict, the federal government can mobilize the U.S. Army National
Guard and Reserve.
Although future events are impossible to predict with
exactitude, governments do exhibit patterns of behavior,
especially if too focused on the exigencies of the moment.
130

Political, economic, and social turmoil create stresses that
demand solutions, and silver bullet solutions are the most
enticing. What the Maginot Line promised France, ASB
promises America: an economical and pristine way to
secure national security interests without becoming embroiled in a protracted land conflict. However, the reality
is that an air-sea-centric strategy unbalances U.S. national
security policy.
Adversaries constantly probe for weaknesses, testing
American resolve and capabilities. A probe could be
limited territorial aggression, intimidation of neighbors
through military posturing, or covert (including proxy)
wars. The unilateral use of air and sea power in such
cases is very rarely effective. From the U.S. perspective,
once committed to ASB, s