Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 126

Conclusion
The growth of ALP forces as well as the ANP, and
the construction of a series of checkpoints throughout
Chora, dramatically improved security in the area and
began to physically push the Taliban out. In addition, the
wall’s sheer presence also demonstrated to local villagers,
GIRoA officials, and tribal leaders that security could be
established and become an enduring condition instead of
a temporary, unsustainable effect.
The growth of the Afghan local security forces was
greatly enabled by the simultaneous construction of
the Great Wall of Chora, which set the conditions for
securing the villages of Nyazi and Chora. Through
shaping the physical terrain of the Chora Valley, the
wall stemmed insurgent infiltration into the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt and secured a section of the
Tarin Kowt/Chora/Gizab Road, which had long been
subject to improvised explosive device attacks.
Moreover, security conditions in the district of Chora
began to dramatically improve when SOF in the area
launched aggressive offensive operations to push the
Taliban back. These actions reassured local Afghan allies
about U.S. determination to defeat the Taliban in the
area instead of merely coexisting with them. Offensive
operations were followed by a robust embedded partnering plan with the ANP and increased support for their
efforts. Village Stability Platform Chora liaised with the
provincial chief of police to ensure greater materiel and

logistical support as well as to improve the morale of
the battered force. Additionally, the subsequent removal of an ineffective district governor and the marginalization of a Taliban sympathizer demonstrated to other
locals that GIRoA was serious about bringing security
and governance to their community.
A community engagement strategy of partnering with and empowering tribal elders to both grow
Afghan local police forces and to get them more involved in local political affairs had an extremely positive effect and furthered the rehabilitation of tribal
leadership structures. Residents were actively enlisted
in their own defense.
Facilitated by U.S. efforts, they participated in local security forces and played an active role in community institutions. The result was that the Taliban
were unable to physically intimidate the population,
entice it to their cause through payments, or take advantage of its grievances to separate the people from
their government.
A balanced approach of using kinetic and nonkinetic strategies greatly enhanced security in the greater
Chora Valley and demonstrated that a determined U.S.
military unit can sufficiently degrade if not defeat a
local Taliban insurgency, given the right approach.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own
and do not represent the U.S. Department of Defense or the
U.S. Department of State.

Dr. Daniel R. Green is a Defense Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy focusing on stability
operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. He is the author of The Valley’s Edge: A Year with the Pashtuns
in the Heartland of the Taliban, and co-author with William F. Mullen III of Fallujah Redux: The Anbar
Awakening and the Struggle with al-Qaeda.

Notes
1. Brian Petit, “The Fight for the Village: Southern Afghanistan, 2010,” Military Review (May-June 2011):25-32;
Robert Hulslander and Jake Spivey, “Village Stabilit