Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 124

checkpoints on their own, protecting some population
centers, but not enough to deny the Taliban access to the
population. They lacked the manpower to do so.
The Taliban took advantage of this tribal power vacuum, the compromised ANA, and the insufficient ANP to
expand their power base in the area. By constantly attacking the ANP through direct attacks, suicide-vest attacks,
and car bombs, the Taliban hobbled the police force.
Following the transition to Afghan control of two village
stability platform sites in northern Chora due to success
in recruiting ALP, the SOF team that arrived in Chora’s
district center in late spring 2012 prepared to shift the balance of power away from the Taliban and toward GIRoA.
Unlike the district of Shahid-e-Hasas, the team’s approach
required more than simply growing ALP. It required a
proactive approach to push the Taliban out, rehabilitate
and empower tribal structures, reassure GIRoA allies, and
shape the physical terrain to inhibit the Taliban’s infiltration routes.

Chora: 2012, the People Respond
The special operations team that arrived in Chora in
2012 had already gained experience in establishing ALP
and was familiar with the larger issues of Chora from having run a village stability platform site in the same district.
The team quickly determined that it had to create breathing space for tribal engagement to take place and for local
officials to begin to see the seriousness of the team’s intention to push the Taliban out. There had long been a view
held by locals in the area that coalition forces had adopted
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a “live and let live” attitude when it came to confronting the
Taliban insurgency.
In an effort to dispel this perception, clearing operations began soon after the team’s arrival—a mix of partnered Afghan Commando raids, determined clearing operations with similarly partnered Afghan National Army
units, and embedded mentoring with the Afghan National
Police. As these operations pushed the Taliban back, the
team began an active round of community engagements,
principally with Barakzai tribal elders, to begin the process
of recruiting local military-age males to serve in the ALP.
This process uncovered a certain elder who, with his sons,
was working with the Taliban to extend his personal power
in the region but had enough plausible deniability to seek
contracts with the coalition and political influence with
GIRoA. This local spoiler could not be killed unless he
engaged in hostile acts, but he could be marginalized.
His true intentions were discerned through his early
suggestion to build a particular police checkpoint near his
village, a task he thought would take the team months to
complete but was accomplished within a few days. Then,
when he was pressed for ALP recruits, he demurred and
left the area. This hidden hand of the insurgency, partly
political and partly tribal, had helped serve as the backbone
of the Taliban’s shadow government in the area. The team
established a checkpoint near his residence that effectively
put pressure on him and his family to either turn away
from the insurgency or at least remain neutral. Subsequent
engagements with area elders signaled an interest by the
community to join the ALP but also indicated concern
March-April 2015  MILITARY REVIEW