Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 121

VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

M

uch of the writing about the Village
Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police
(VSO/ALP) Program in Afghanistan is of
a theoretical nature. While this body of work sometimes uses a limited number of anecdotes to illustrate
key concepts, it often lacks a long-term perspective
on one area of the war and rarely integrates security,
governance, and development initiatives simultaneously.1 Additionally, tribal leaders, factional histories, and
a historical perspective are often missing in studies of
VSO/ALP, where emphasis is generally placed upon
the actions of U.S. units, with Afghan efforts only peripherally discussed.2
What is required is a holistic presentation of village
stability operations in practice that balances U.S. efforts
with Afghan initiatives and integrates all the key lines
of operation in a manner that provides a long-term
perspective on one district or village in Afghanistan.
The district of Chora in the southern Afghanistan
province of Uruzgan provides a unique opportunity
to provide such a perspective. I originally worked
in Uruzgan with the U.S. Department of State as
the political officer to the Tarin Kowt Provincial
Reconstruction Team in 2005–2006 and then returned to the province in 2012 as a mobilized reservist working as a tribal and political engagement officer
at Special Operations Task Force–South East. These
experiences as both a civilian and a member of the
U.S. military provided me with a holistic perspective on the area and greatly informed my views on
U.S. operations in the region. Additionally, because I
served in the province for two lengthy periods of time
separated by six years, I gained a long-term perspective of not just Uruzgan Province but of the district of
Chora in particular.

Uruzgan Province: The Heartland of
the Taliban
The district of Chora is located just east of Uruzgan
Province’s capital of Tarin Kowt and sits along the
Karmisan River, which flows southwest and eventually
feeds into the Helmand River. It is largely made up of
barren desert and stark mountains. The population
lives along densely packed green swathes of farmland,
where local residents eke out a basic existence cultivating the arable land that collects in the river basin and at
the bases of the mountains.
MILITARY REVIEW  March-April 2015

The district’s approximately 20,000 residents are
divided into two sections by a mountain range that
bisects the middle of the region from east to west. The
whole area is predominately Pashtun and is generally
divided into the Barakzai and Achikzai tribes in the
northern portion and the Populzai in the south around
the village of Chenartu. Hazaran and Baluch ethnic
communities are also present, with the Hazaran population in larger numbers in the northern areas closer
to the predominantly Hazaran province of Dai Kundi.
The district borders Zabul Province to the south and
Dai Kundi to the north, and the Uruzgan districts of
Khas Uruzgan to the east, Tarin Kowt to the south,
and Shahid-e-Hasas to the west.
The Chora area has long served as a transit hub for
insurgents from both Helmand and Zabul Provinces.
They pour into the districts respectively west and east
of Chora and then transit, finally, to the provincial
capital of Tarin Kowt. The population is generally
anti-Taliban because of their largely Durrani Pashtun
tribal affiliation (the Taliban are typically affiliated
with the Ghilzai tribal confederation) and are more
naturally inclined to support the government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

Chora: 2005 to 2006–The Taliban
Return
The district of Chora was considered the safest in
Uruzgan Province in late 2005. Although it did not
have a coalition forces base located in its district center,
the active patrolling of 25th Infantry Division units
located in Khas Uruzgan District to its east, as well
as patrols from the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt,
dissuaded the Taliban from establishing a presence
in the area. The key tribal chiefs of the Barakzai and
Achikzai tribes in the area were substantial leaders in
the province, the former being the provincial chief of
police and the latter a member of parliament. Although
both tribes were influential in their own way, they
were largely excluded from the political power of the
provincial government, which was dominated by
members of the governor’s Populzai tribe. The leaders
of the Populzai tribe in southern Chora had benefitted
greatly from the provincial government’s largesse and,
although they lived in much poorer circumstances than
their district neighbors to the north, had more influence with key leaders in the capital.
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