Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 12

they endeavor to control territory and populations.
Some of the armed conflicts that fit this pattern
today include those in Mali, Libya, Nigeria, Yemen,
Somalia, Central African Republic, Syria, Iraq,
Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Thailand, and the
Philippines. Understanding the special circumstances and recent experiences of the people among
whom wars are fought is essential if military forces
are to avoid mistakes, consolidate gains, and isolate
enemies from popular support.
Understanding the human aspects of war prepares leaders, soldiers, and teams for operations in
environments of complexity and persistent danger.
Moral, ethical, and psychological preparation for
c ombat is critical to building resilient soldiers and
cohesive teams that are committed to the Army’s
professional ethic. Concepts or plans that neglect
the human aspect of war are unlikely to achieve
lasting favorable outcomes. Neglecting the political
and human continuities of war can lead to confusing
military activity with progress.

Third, War is Uncertain

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Coalition plans did
not always keep pace with shifts in the character
of those conflicts. In Afghanistan, planned reductions in troops continued even as the Taliban gained
control of territory and populations in the south and
east between 2004 and 2009. In Iraq, the strategy
remained based on rapid transition to Iraqi Security
Forces even as large percentages of those forces had
become party to a sectarian civil war. Some aspects
of the coalition military effort, such as the absence of
operational reserves, or the practice of announcing
changes in mission and force levels years in advance
reveal a tendency to assume that our plans dictate
the future course of events and that progress in war
is linear and predictable.
The AOC emphasizes the tenet of adaptability
and the need for leaders to “assess the situation continuously, develop innovative solutions to problems,
and remain mentally and physically agile to capitalize on opportunities.”9 The AOC also redefines the
tenet of depth to highlight the need to “think ahead
in time and determine how to connect tactical and
operational objectives to strategic goals.”10

Although advances in technology will continue to
influence the character of warfare, the effect of technologies on land are often not as great as in other domains
due to geography, the interaction with adaptive enemies,
the presence of noncombatants, and other complexities
associated with war’s continuities.

Fourth, War is a Contest of Wills

The dominant assumption of the RMA was that
knowledge would be the key to victory in future
war. Near-perfect intelligence would enable precise
military operations that, in turn, would deliver rapid
victory. In Afghanistan and Iraq, planning based on
linear projections did not anticipate enemy adaptations or the evolution of those conflicts in ways that
were difficult to predict at the outset.
Army professionals recognize war’s uncertainty because they are sensitive to war’s political and
human aspects, and they know from experience
and history that war always involves a continuous
interaction with determined, adaptive enemies. That
continuous interaction with enemies and adversaries
helped determine the course of events in the long

Clausewitz defined strategy as a sustained act of
will necessary to master war’s terrible uncertainties.
Strategy begins with establishing a clearly defined
objective or goal. Strategic goals in Afghanistan and
Iraq were, at times, ambiguous. Ambiguity was, in
part, due to a belief that one can achieve acceptable
outcomes in war without a commitment to win.
Because war is a competition involving life and
death, and in which each side tries to outdo the
other, establishing objectives other than winning
can be counterproductive and wasteful. Winning is
psychological and moral, as well as physical. Ending
war, as Clausewitz observed, requires persuading the
enemy that he has been defeated. Winning in war,
however, neither requires unconditional surrender

—The U.S. Army Operating Concept8

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While the ability to shape security environments through
the threat of punitive action will remain important, Army
forces conduct positive actions essential to reassuring allies,
influencing neutrals, and dissuading adversaries.

—The U.S. Army Operating Concept11

March-April 2015  MILITARY REVIEW