Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 119

ANBAR AWAKENING
www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4779
(accessed 10 February 2015).
7. Norman Cigar, Al-Qaida, The Tribes, and the Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq’s Unstable Triangle,
Middle East Studies Occasional Papers, Number Two, September 2011 (Quantico VA: Marine Corps University Press,
2011) 38-43; McWilliams and Wheeler, Volume I, 154-156;
McWilliams and Wheeler, Volume II, 45-49, 54-57, 110-112,
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/Al-AnbarAwakeningVolII[1].pdf (Accessed 10 February 2015); Thomas
Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American
Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008 (New York: The Penguin
Press, 2009) 221-222; William A. Doyle, A Soldier’s Dream:
Captain Travis Patriquin and the Awakening of Iraq (New York:
NAL Caliber, 2011) 151-163; Neil Smith and Sean MacFarland,
“Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,” Military Review (March–
April 2008): 41–52.
8. McWilliams and Wheeler, Volume II, 45-49, 54-57, 110-112;
Doyle, 123-130.
9. Mark Wilbanks and Efraim Karsh , “How the Sons of Iraq
Stabilized Iraq,” The Middle East Quarterly 17(14)(Fall 2010) 5770; and Myriam Benraad, “Iraq’s Tribal ‘Sahwa’: Its Rise and Fall,”
Middle East Policy Council 18(1)(Spring 2011), http://www.mepc.
org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/iraqs-tribal-sahwa-its-riseand-fall (accessed 10 February 2015).
10. Cigar, 61-73.
11. Ibid., 64-88.
12. Wilbanks and Karsh, 57-70; Benraad.
13. Neil Smith and Sean MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: The
Tipping Point,” Military Review (March–April 2008), 41–52; Doyle,
123-130.
14. Money as a Weapon, The Washington Post Online Data
Bank,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/cerp/
(accessed 6 January 2015).
15. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR),
letter for the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Office of Management
and Budget, “Commander’s Emergency Response Program

Obligations are Uncertain,” 31 January 2011, 4; and SIGIR, “Sons
of Iraq Program: Results are Uncertain and Financial Controls are
Weak,” 28 January 2011, 1.
16. Cigar, 33-35; Ricks, 219-227.
17. Cigar, 9-32; Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links
to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments,
109th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, September 8, 2006, 9093; Craig Whitlock, “Death Could Shake Al-Qaeda In Iraq and
Around the World,” The Washington Post, 10 June 2006.
18. Bill Roggio, “The Rump Islamic Emirate of Iraq,” The
Long War Journal (16 October 2006).
19. Cigar, 46-47; Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and
Jacob Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline
in Iraq in 2007?” International Security (Summer 2012); Vijay
K. Saraswat, The Sons of Iraq and the Search for Legitimacy
Among the Sunni Tribes, Peace Keeping & Stability Operations
Institute (PKSOI) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010), 8; McWilliams and Wheeler, Volume II, 228.
20. Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History (New
York: Encounter Books, 2009); Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents:
David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of
War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013); David Kilcullen,
Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big
One (London: Oxford University Press, 2009); Ricks. These
are fine works but tend to understate the contributions from
Anbar relative to the strategy that Petraeus and company
brought in during 2007.
21. James A. Baker III et al., The Iraq Study Group Report,
http://media.usip.org/reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf
(accessed 10 February 2015); 2007 State of the Union Address,
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-2.html (accessed 10 February 2015).
22. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War within
the War for Afghanistan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012).
This book provides a critical account of the U.S. and Afghan
bureaucracies in Afghanistan.

M We Recommend
R
Tribal Militias
An Effective Tool to Counter Al-Qaida and Its Affiliates?
United States Army War College Press, Carlisle Barracks, PA

I

n this monograph, Dr. Norman Cigar identifies two models for tribal
militias—either managed by local governments and supported by outside
patrons or managed directly by an outside agent. It notes a number of lessons learned for the United States while acting as the direct managing patron
of these groups.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1230.pdf

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