Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 117

ANBAR AWAKENING

security services, Arab-Kurd conflicts over disputed territories too inflammatory to deal with on
the Iraqi constitution’s time table, the emergence
of the Islamic State, and the aspirations of Iraq’s
neighbors.
Any combination of these could bring back the
level of violence and disorder of open civil war.
The Awakening is an indication that the United
States must respect a country’s diverse peoples and
consider them the foremost potential ally without
whom it cannot expect to meet any goal in the
country worth pursuing.

Questions for Future Programs
Some questions to be asked of any program in
another theater that invokes or draws inspiration
from the Anbar Awakening follow:
Does the proposed group have a shared interest—however narrow—with the United States
that will make it cooperate with us? To what
extent does this interest overcome any grievances
the group may have with the United States?
Do the components of the group have any
internal disputes or factions? How would we
manage these?
To what extent would U.S. cooperation
with the group taint the group’s reputation,
depicting it as a collaborator with an outside
power? How can we manage the U.S. hand in
order to not make the group look like a tool of
(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Erin Kirk)
the United States?
Sheikh Aifan Sadun al-Issawi meets with Sen. Chuck Hagel, Nebraska,
Does the United States have the means and
in Anbar Province to discuss the progress against antigovernment
personnel resources to keep the group or its leadinsurgents in Anbar Province (circa 2008). Aifan was one of the founders
ers acting in accord?
of the Sahawa movement and among the most active counterinsurgent
leaders, personally leading his militia in numerous attacks against alTo what extent is there already an indigeQaida members operating in Anbar Province.
nous trend that can be co-opted or guided?
from developing their energy sector. These actions are
Would the program involve local control of
difficult to explain in any context other than parothe group’s own area? (If the program envisions an
chial sectarianism.
expeditionary force outside the group’s area, it should
Saddam Hussein compelled the Sunni, Shia, and
probably not claim inspiration from the Awakening.)
Kurds to live together, but in a post-Saddam Iraq,
How can the most influential and authentic
experience has shown that no two will submit to the leaders be determined?
third. As a result, Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic fault
By entering into an arrangement with any one
lines have threatened political stability. These fault
of the group’s leaders, which other centers of power
lines rumble over the notable failure to integrate
(government entities, parties, warlords, or tribes) will
the mostly Sunni SOI into the Iraqi Security Forces,
be angered, marginalized, emboldened, or otherwise
tribal rivalries, sectarian identification of certain
affected? How would this be managed?

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