Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 114

(AP photo)

Sheikh Abdel Sattar Abu Risha, founder of al-Anbar Awakening, arrives for a meeting with tribal leaders of Iraq’s Anbar Province in the
provincial capital of Ramadi, 115 kilometers (70 miles) west of Baghdad, 16 August 2007. They promised to “work together against terrorism, militias, and al-Qaida until they’re uprooted from the country.” Prior to the Awakening, Sattar was a minor sheikh of little prominence with a criminal history that reputedly included smuggling and highjacking.

twenty-first century, Western, self-styled progressives.
For example, in general, the key sheiks had no democratic or pluralistic impulses and would manifest no
respect for the U.S. policy of democratization beyond
what they had to utter in order to remain in U.S. graces
if and when they chose to do so.
Instead, the Anbar Awakening figures were products
of a society where power rested in tribal codes, patronage, and nepotism as opposed to legal state institutions.
Their adherence to these codes, especially the custom of
tribal retributions, were often viewed by U.S. officials as
human rights violations, according to Western standards.
One consequence of this situation was that, although Iraq
ostensibly had a written code of law enforced by state
security and judicial mechanisms, in reality, these institutions were nominal, co-opted by insurgents, or lacked the
will to carry out their functions under the established law.
Among other concerns, U.S. officials were right to
be vigilant about their contacts’ deeds and to pressure
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them to act within Iraqi law. However, in cases where
individuals had committed extra-judicial acts, the
United States had to assess whether there was a viable
Iraqi governmental mechanism that could have provided a solution and be ready to make the case for the
value of continued work with that person in the face
of any potential scrutiny, whether from formal U.S.
oversight bodies or from the media.
The United States found mutual interests with
conservative Muslim populations that al-Qaida
claimed to be helping. One of the ways al-Qaida tries
to build support in a population is by depicting itself as
a defender against, or liberator from, infidel aggression.
For example, in Anbar, not only had a Western military
occupied Sunni Muslim lands, but the Sunnis’ Shia rivals
had come to power in the national government. Both
of these developments were fodder for public opinion exploitation. Of all the places al-Qaida sought to establish
itself, Anbar, in theory, should have been receptive.
March-April 2015  MILITARY REVIEW