Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 112

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Megan Curry)

Sheikh Lawrence al-Aniza speaks with Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha during a sheikh shura 24 June 2009 at Camp Ramadi, Iraq. The shura
provided a unique opportunity for paramount sheikhs and provincial government leaders of Al Anbar Province to discuss issues facing
the province and work together to come up with solutions.

The solution in Anbar required an intimate
U.S. knowledge of local realities. Solutions required
an objective depiction of the so-called ground truth.
Direct, on-the-ground knowledge was often the only
option for understanding broader cultural issues and
fast-breaking security developments in the absence of
working phone lines, cell phone reception, Internet,
and media outlets. The U.S. role in the Awakening
required close first-hand observation and familiarity
with local conditions to detect the anti-AQI currents
and motivations of the tribal leaders. Gaining intimate knowledge of realities in Anbar was not possible
by watching Anbar from afar, and, under the best of
circumstances, it did not happen quickly.
U.S. elements successfully marketed these activities as part of a broader anti-AQI phenomenon and
an expression of Iraqi initiatives. For example, at the
police recruitment drives, a given recruit arrived to see
an organized, safe event with Iraqi and U.S. personnel
working together. The orderliness and efficiency of such
programs made a tremendous positive psychological
impact on such individuals, who were accustomed to
the inefficient, uncaring, and usually corrupt management of similar programs under Iraqi holdover officials
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of the previous regime. Once serving at the police
station, the local policeman became part of a powerful
anti-AQI front. U.S.-backed AQI degradation campaigns, media announcements of successful operations,
neighborhood beautification programs, soccer field
refurbishments, and pro-government messages worked
together to further the Awakening’s momentum.13
On the tactical side, the U.S. military and
Awakening units vigorously targeted AQI, disrupted
its networks, conducted raids on its cell leaders, and
denied it a hospitable environment. The tribal rejection
of AQI in 2006 involved tribesmen in fierce firefights
with, and offensive operations against, AQI. Continued
joint military work among MNF–I units, Iraqi security
services, and Awakening units was required to clear
and hold the key areas.
The Awakening required tremendous expenditures of U.S. taxpayer dollars—but with an important caveat. In addition to the costs of deploying
a Marine expeditionary force and special operations
forces in Anbar, training the Iraqi army and Iraqi police, and housing officials from other U.S. civilian agencies, the United States spent tens of millions of dollars
in Anbar. In the form of Commander’s Emergency
March-April 2015  MILITARY REVIEW